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This paper documents the importance of nonbanks in retail payments in the United States and in 15 
European countries and analyses the implications of the importance and multiple roles played by 
nonbanks on retail payment risks. It shows that nonbanks play multiple roles along the whole payment 
processing chain of five main payment instruments (card payments, electronic cheques, credit transfers, 
direct debits and e-money and other pre-funded/stored value instruments). The importance of nonbanks 
is assessed as prominent in the United States across all the considered payment instruments, and high 
and growing in Europe where however differences among the various countries and payments classes 
persist. In Europe the importance of nonbanks is expected to grow in the future, driven by industry and 
regulatory developments. The paper argues that nonbanks’ presence has shifted the locus of risks in 
retail payments toward a higher relevance of operational risk in its various forms (malfunctioning, data 
security, and data protection), as well as higher relevance of fraud risk and system-wide impact of 
disruptions at key providers concentrating processing for important payment market segments. Banks 
have become increasingly dependent on nonbank service providers, and the adoption of new 
technologies in payments processing, particularly as regards communication networks, while on the 
one hand supporting mitigation of credit and liquidity risks connected to payments authorisation, 
increases the number of possible points along the processing chain that may be vulnerable to fraud and 
illicit use. The paper reviews the main regulatory safeguards in place, and concludes that there may be 
a need to reconsider some of them in view of the growing role of nonbanks and of the global reach of 
risks in the electronic era. 
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1.  Introduction 
Retail payment systems throughout the world continue to evolve in many ways. Chief 
among them is the continued migration from paper-based to electronic-based systems.  
Accompanying this electronification of payments has been an increase in the prevalence 
of nonbanks in the payments system. 
In an earlier paper (ECB, FRBKC 2007), we took a first step in documenting and 
analysing the role of nonbanks in European and U.S. retail payment systems.  We found 
that nonbanks are most prominent in the United States but are prominent—and becoming 
ever more so—in many European countries as well.  We also found that the regulatory 
framework surrounding nonbank payments participants is uneven both within and across 
countries. 
This second finding is particularly important for central banks because central banks 
are almost uniformly charged with ensuring that payment systems are safe as well as 
efficient.  At the core of “safety” considerations, of course, is the presence and mitigation 
of various types of risk. The earlier paper spent some time exploring risk issues, but at a 
fairly general level.  The purpose of this paper is to delve more deeply into risk issues.   
Specifically, this paper explores the various types of risk associated with the many 
activities along the payments chain, and asks, to what extent does the presence of 
nonbanks heighten or lessen these risks?  As with the first paper, this paper draws on the 
results of a joint study undertaken by staff at the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The focus is on electronic (non-paper) retail 
payment services in the European Union (EU) and the United States. The paper adopts a 
common set of definitions and a uniform analytical framework.  
The following questions are addressed: 
1.  What payments activities and subactivities are performed along the 
payments chain? 
2.  What types of risk are associated with these activities and subactivities? 
3.  Do the risks associated with various payments activities and subactivities 
vary by type of payments instrument? 
4.  Does the increased presence of nonbanks in various payments activities 
heighten or lessen the degree of risk? 
5.  Are adequate safeguards—private and/or public—in place to ensure that 
risk levels are manageable and acceptable? 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section assesses the importance of 
nonbanks in retail payments. It first summarizes the methodology used in this and the 
previous paper: the definition of “nonbank,” the difference between front-end and back-
end payment services, and the various categories of payment types and payment 
activities. It then documents the role played by nonbanks in the EU and the United States.  Page  4 
The third section of the paper takes up risk in retail payments. It first describes the 
various types of risk that may be present in a payments environment, for example, 
settlement risk, operational risk, reputational risk, and so forth.  It then examines which 
types of risk are most likely to be associated with which types of activities along the 
payments processing chain.  The fourth section of the paper “superimposes” this risk 
analysis on the prior section’s documentation of nonbank presence by activity, permitting 
one to evaluate at a relatively detailed level nonbanks’ potential impact on payments risk. 
Finally, the paper closes with a summary and suggestions for future research. 
2.  Nonbanks in retail payment systems 
2.1  Methodology 
Nonbanks can perform functions at all stages of the payments process. For all forms 
of payment (credit cards, debit cards, electronic-cheques, credit and debit transfers, e-
money
1, and stored-value transactions) and for all points on the payments chain 
(hardware and software provision, consumer and merchant interaction, backroom 
processing, clearing and settlement, and post-transaction accounting) nonbanks can play a 
major role. This subsection provides a framework for documenting and analyzing these 
roles. 
2.1.1 Definitions 
A nonbank payment service provider is defined in this study as any enterprise that is 
not a bank and which provides, primarily by way of electronic means, payment services 
to its customers. In the European context, nonbanks include all entities that are not 
authorized as a credit institution; hence, electronic money institutions (ELMIs) are 
considered to be nonbanks. In the U.S. context, nonbanks include all entities that do not 
accept demand deposits. A nonbank payment service provider may be either bank-
controlled or nonbank-controlled.
2 
A nonbank payment system provider’s customers may be either: (i) end-users of retail 
payment services, in which case the nonbank is providing front-end services; (ii) banks or 
                                                 
1 In Europe, e-money is defined as “monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is: (i) 
stored on an electronic device, such as a chip card or computer memory; (ii) issued on receipt of funds of 
an amount not less in value than the monetary value issued; (iii) accepted as means of payment by 
undertakings other than the issuer (Directive 2000/46/EC).” Thus, strictly speaking e-money is not a 
payment instrument but a means of payment, that is, a substitute for cash and deposits. E-money issuance is 
usually accompanied by the service or device needed to transfer it, and for simplicity in this survey with the 
term e-money we refer to the payment devise or instrument used to transfer e-money. E-money can be 
issued only by banks and by e-money licensed institutions (ELMIs), entities subject to a simplified 
prudential regime which is however modelled on that of banks, and are subject to certain limitations (for 
instance in terms of activities they can carry out, and investment of the funds). 
2 Examples of bank-controlled nonbank payment service providers include subsidiaries of banks, for 
example, TSYS, a large U.S. processor owned by Synovus Bank (although about to be spun off), and bank 
associations, for example, Visa Europe, the large European credit and debit card network. Nonbank-
controlled service providers are firms without a governing bank affiliation, for example, First Data 
Corporation, PayPal, Hypercom, Vodafone, etc.  Page  5 
other nonbank payment service providers, in which case the nonbank is providing back-
end services; or (iii) both types of customers. Examples of front-end services include 
money-transfer services provided to households and acquiring services provided to 
merchants. Examples of back-end services include back-office data processing, 
authentication and authorization, and hosting of payments-enabled web sites. An example 
of a firm with both types of customers is a company that is leasing point-of-sale (POS) 
devices to merchants and at the same time performing processing and routing services on 
the data captured on those devices for the banks issuing the associated payment cards. 
Such a firm would be considered to be providing front-end services to the merchants and 
back-end services to the issuing banks. 
2.1.2 Payment types and payment activities 
There are two ways to think about the payments process. One is to think about 
payment types—the means and instruments through which a transaction is undertaken. 
Examples are credit card transactions, debit card transactions, credit and debit transfers, 
and person-to-person Internet payments. The second way is to think about payment 
activities—the various steps and services that are provided as a given transaction takes 
place. These two concepts—payment types and payment activities—are clearly very 
closely related. 
Table 1 (p. 41) shows the broad payment types that are used in this paper. Categories 
include electronic cheques; credit transfers; direct debits; payment (credit and debit) 
cards; and e-money and other prefunded or stored-value instruments, including Internet 
person-to-person  (P2P) payments.
3 The first category, electronic-cheques, are those 
payment types that begin with a paper cheque, or information from a paper cheque, but 
are converted to an electronic payment at some point in the process; end-to-end, 
traditional paper cheques are excluded. The second and third categories, credit transfers 
and direct debits, utilize agreements that credit or, with preauthorization, debit accounts. 
The fourth category, payment (credit/debit) cards, relies on networks to access either a 
line of credit or a demand deposit account to enable a payment. The fifth category, e-
money and other pre-funded/stored-value instruments, uses an electronic store of 
monetary value, which may not necessarily involve a bank account, to make a payment.  
A second way of thinking about the payments process is to examine payment 
activities, that is, the various steps and services that are undertaken as a transaction 
moves from beginning to end. The payments process can be thought of as a chain of 
events in which four principal categories of services are performed:  
•  pre-transaction activities encompassing customer acquisition and the 
provision of front-end infrastructure;  
•  during-transaction Stage 1 activities encompassing connection, 
communication, authorization, and fraud detection activities;  
                                                 
3 ECB, FRBKC (2007) includes two additional instrument categories:  money remittance and transfer 
transactions; and other payment instruments.  They are not considered in this paper because of insufficient 
data in some of the surveyed countries. Page  6 
•  during-transaction Stage 2 activities encompassing clearing and settlement 
activities; and 
•  post-transaction activities encompassing statement provision and 
reconciliation activities.  
All in all, one can identify twenty-three primary payment activities that underlie, to 
varying degrees, all payment transactions. Within these twenty-three primary activities, 
there are, in turn, a host of subactivities, numbering over fifty. The full list of primary 
activities and subactivities is shown in Table 2 (p. 42). 
2.2  Nonbank prevalence 
2.2.1 Overview 
A payment transaction can be initiated in several ways, and the related payment 
information and instructions can be captured and transmitted using several methods. 
Nonbanks can be involved at many points along the processing chain, as well as in the 
direct provision of payment services to end customers.  
Nonbanks have long had a presence in core payments processing, as banks and other 
financial institutions have sought to outsource such activities as data processing, file 
transmission, and related tasks. Other during-transaction activities in which nonbanks 
have been heavily involved include network services, such as gateway provision and 
switching services, authorization services, and fraud and risk management services. All 
of these activities are important elements of the retail payments process and are of key 
importance in maintaining public confidence in the safety of payment instruments.  
Additionally, nonbanks have been active in the range of activities that take place 
before and after the execution of a given payment transaction. Examples of such pre-
transaction activities include the development and provision of hardware for electronic 
payments (for example, card production and POS devices) and the establishment of 
contractual relations with cardholders and merchants.  In the case of emerging payments, 
in many cases these pre-transaction services involve new ways of providing access to 
traditional payment types, for example, credit transfers initiated via the Internet or via 
mobile phones, or web portals that consolidate billing and facilitate payment initiation. 
Moreover, nonbanks have also been important in many post-transaction services, 
including statement provision, reconciliation, and retrieval.  
This subsection documents in a systematic way the role played by nonbanks in the 
EU and U.S. retail payment systems. The analysis is conducted through the use of tables 
showing, for each of the various payment activities and each of the various payment 
types, the importance of nonbanks relative to banks.  
In the case of Europe, five tables are presented, one for each of the major payment 
instruments, Payment Cards, Credit Transfers, Direct Debits, e-Cheques, and e-Money. 
Within each of these tables, for each payment activity, the degree of nonbank prevalence 
is shown, moving, left to right, from surveyed countries accounting for the largest share 
of EU27 payments of that type to countries accounting for the smallest share of EU27 Page  7 
payments of that type. Thus, each table is a matrix, in which the rows are payment 
activities, the columns are countries, and the entry in an individual cell is the authors’ 
assessment of whether nonbank presence is prevalent (blue), high (green), medium 
(yellow), low (orange), or nonexistent (pink) for that particular payment activity-payment 
type-country combination.  
In the case of the United States, a single table is presented.  Rows are again payment 
activities.  Columns are now payment types, moving, left to right, from those payment 
types accounting for the largest share of noncash payments to those accounting for the 
smallest share of noncash payments.  Thus, the table is again a matrix, in which the entry 
in an individual cell is the authors’ assessment of whether nonbank presence is prevalent 
(blue), high (green), medium (yellow), low (orange), or nonexistent (pink) for that 
particular payment activity-payment type combination.  For both the United States and 
Europe, cells in grey are not applicable, while cells in white indicate insufficient 
information to judge. The assessments are based on survey results, industry data, and 
other sources. Also indicated in each cell is an assessment of the quality of the data (high, 
medium, or low) on which the “prevalence” assessment is based. 
2.2.2 EU nonbank prevalence 
The role of nonbanks in payments in Europe was analyzed by carrying out a survey 
among Payment Experts of the National Central Banks (NCBs). The survey was 
voluntary, and not all the ESCB National Central Banks participated. The results 
presented include 15 countries, 10 from the euro area (Austria, Belgium,
4 Germany, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia) and five from EU 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Latvia and Lithuania). These countries together process about 67 percent of the number 
of payment transactions in the European Union.  
However, as the NCBs of the largest non-euro area Member States did not participate 
in the survey (in particular the U. K., which alone counts for more than 20 percent of the 
number of payments processed in the EU), the focus of the analysis is mainly on the euro 
area:  the above mentioned 10 euro area countries in the survey together process about 92 
percent of the total number of euro area payment transactions, and 66 percent of the total 
EU payment transactions.
5 All in all, these ten countries represent 65 percent of the EU 
GDP (88 percent of the euro area), and 54 percent of the EU population (86 percent of the 
euro area population).  
The survey was carried out using a common methodology. Some respondents stressed 
that they faced data limitations that did not allow considering the results as a 
comprehensive and exhaustive description of the role of nonbanks in their respective 
countries. Thus, the survey does not imply that these are the only activities that nonbanks 
perform in payment processing or that all payment solutions offered to customers in the 
surveyed countries are covered. Moreover, the level of detail and the quality of the data 
                                                 
4 For Belgium an assessment of nonbanks’ importance was available only for cards and e-money payments. 
5 The percentages provided are based on 2003 data and include the countries that joined the EU in 2004 
(i.e., excluding Bulgaria and Romania who joined in 2007). Page  8 
varies from country to country, as respondents relied on different data sources and 
research methodologies, ranging from publicly available information to interviews with 
major banks and nonbanks. For some countries, the survey’s findings provide more of an 
overview than a fully representative picture. These differences in comprehensiveness and 
quality of data gathered in the various countries make it difficult to carry out cross-
country comparisons, and require care in considering the results.  Nevertheless, in the 
absence of more precise or homogeneous data, we accept these data limitations and 
believe that the survey provides a useful overview of the role of nonbanks in payments, 
shedding some light on an aspect of the European payment industry that was not 
thoroughly investigated previously. 
The results are reported, for each payment instrument (electronically processed 
cheques, credit transfers, direct debits, payment cards, e-money and other payment 
instruments), in Tables 3-7 (pp. 43-47). The results are presented following the order of 
importance of the various cashless payment instruments in terms of number of 
transactions processed in Europe: in 2003 (the most recent year for which cross-country 
comparable data are available) cards represented 31 percent of European payment 
transactions, followed by credit transfers (30 percent), direct debits (24 percent), cheques 
(13 percent
6), and e-money (1 percent). It should be noted that comprehensive statistics 
are not available for money transfers or for “other, innovative payment instruments” 
included in the survey sent to respondents. Furthermore, the data collected through the 
survey on nonbanks for these two instruments were extremely limited and do not allow 
making any but a preliminary assessment of the role of nonbanks.  
Before moving into each table, it is important to underline three preliminary 
observations:  
First, information on the role of nonbanks is not equally available across countries 
and across payment instruments, as shown by the large white areas in many of the 
countries. Information on entities involved in retail payments processing may be more 
easily available for those payment instruments that are more popular in the country: 
national preferences in the use of payment instruments are very marked in Europe, 
reflecting cultural preferences,
7 traditions, historical development of the industry, or 
different stages of maturity in the payment services industry. For instance, cheques are 
not used in the Netherlands (where their use declined already in the ‘90s, and the Dutch 
                                                 
6 Statistics on cheques in the European Union include all cheques submitted for clearing. The figures 
include various types of transactions (e.g. traveller’s cheques, petrol cheques, bankers’ drafts and 
promissory notes), as there are no separate statistics for e-cheques.  However, most cheques are truncated in 
Europe, and paper end-to-end processing can be considered as an exception taking place only in a few 
countries. (For instance, in the United Kingdom a change in the law in 1996 removed the requirement for 
cheques to be presented physically at the branch on which they were drawn. Most banks now follow a 
partially truncated process whereby cheques are retained at a central point and). In France all cheques are 
truncated and dematerialised since 2002; in Italy 80 percent of cheques are truncated; in Portugal, 98 
percent of cheques were truncated in 2005. In some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) cheques have been 
completely dismissed as a payment instrument and do exist either in paper or in electronic form. See ECB 
(2006) and ECB (2007b) for further details. 
7 The impact of preferences in terms of cultural similarities, geographical proximities, and language was 
shown by Rosati and Secola (2006) for large-value cross-border payments in euro. It is likely that in the 
retail markets cultural preferences may also play a role. Page  9 
banks stopped issuing cheques in July 2001), they are rarely used in Austria and Finland, 
and their use is very limited, compared to other payment solutions, in Germany, while 
they are still common in France (where more than 55 percent of all EU cheques 
transactions take place), Italy, Cyprus, and Portugal (although their use is, in general, 
declining)
8. Italy, Belgium, and Finland can be considered “credit transfers countries” 
(and in Bulgaria about 90 percent of payments are credit transfers) while direct debits 
have been introduced relatively recently in several countries and are becoming 
increasingly popular (in 2003 direct debits were about 24 percent of payments in EU, but 
in Austria, Germany, and Spain they represented about 40 percent of the national 
volumes). In contrast, card payments are common and popular in most countries. Thus, 
respondents were able to assess the importance of nonbanks for almost all the relevant 
payment activities with a relatively high confidence for payment cards. 
Second, nonbank presence varies significantly by country. In general, when 
considering nonbanks importance across all payment instruments for each country, 
countries can be divided in three groups (ECB, FRBKC 2007). In a first group, including 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, nonbanks play a larger role compared to 
other countries in the activities of most payment types. Finland, France, Latvia and 
Slovenia are in the second group, where nonbanks seem to play a more limited role. The 
last group includes the remaining countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Lithuania and Portugal. Nonbank presence in these countries can be considered 
somewhere in between. 
Third, in the majority of the 15 countries, the role of nonbanks for payment cards is 
high or prevalent in many of the activities considered. This is probably due to the high 
automation of the pre-transaction and during-transaction Stage 1 activities (e.g., switch 
routing, authentication, and real-time authorization of the transaction) and, also, to the 
international dimension of cards-processing standards. It should be noted that in Europe 
there are a number of national card schemes that are usually co-branded with the 
international schemes like Visa and MasterCard to allow customers to use the card 
abroad. In addition to co-branding, in Europe there also are a few examples of (bilateral) 
interoperability agreements between national (mainly debit cards) schemes, particularly 
to allow use in the EU cross-border context. As a result, cards processing is largely 
organized around a common model, except for the settlement phase, which may be 
carried out differently in the various countries. (In some countries, national card 
transactions are settled in the ACH or other national retail payment system. In others, 
they may be settled by banks bilaterally. Furthermore, as it relates to international cards 
transactions, the correspondent banking channel normally is used for settling interbank 
positions). 
The tables show that the role of nonbanks is high in most surveyed countries for 
cards, with the exception of France (where there is a tradition of reserving the payments 
business to banks) and the Czech Republic, where it was assessed as medium for all 
                                                 
8 This explains why France is the country where cheques processing is highly automated also in the initial 
stages of the processing chain (pre-transaction and during-transaction Stage 1, e.g. provision of cheques 
readers/POS, provision of cheques verification software and of cheques verification services) and more 
information is available on nonbanks’ roles in cheques processing, while in other countries the cheques 
column contains a good deal of white and grey cells.  Page  10 
payment instruments. However, in France, nonbanks still play an important role in the 
pre-transaction stage. For the other payment instruments, as mentioned earlier, 
respondents to the survey were able to provide relatively less data, as shown by the high 
number of grey and white cells. Where more information was available (as for credit 
transfers and direct debits) nonbanks seem to play a relatively more important role in 
those countries that represent a higher share of the EU traffic in that instrument and the 
payment instrument concerned represents a high share of the national payments (for 
example, for credit transfers: Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands), again, with the 
exception of France.  
Finally, irrespective of the role played in pre-transaction and other during-transaction 
activities, the settlement phase remains a prerogative of the banking sector in Europe, and 
this is true for all payment instruments, not only for cards. In the case of traditional 
payment instruments, this may be explained by the fact that banks are normally those 
entities that have access to the retail payment systems (and, in many cases, national 
banking associations actually have set up or own the national clearing and settlement 
companies) or those to whom the legislation in place reserves settlement accounts 
provision and management. 
In very few countries (the Netherlands and Bulgaria), however, nonbanks may play a 
role in the settlement stage. However, a closer look at the entities involved shows that 
they are jointly owned by the banking sector, and thus can be considered in the banking 
domain (e.g. the companies Equens in the Netherlands, Borica (Bank Organisation for 
Payments Initiated by Cards) and Bankservise in Bulgaria). A notable exception is 
Belgium, where nonbanks’ importance in settlement activities 18a and 18b from Table 2 
(posting credit and debit at each financial institution’s central bank and commercial bank 
account) is assessed as “prevalent”. This is related to the role played by the cards national 
processor, the previously bank-owned Banksys. The company is now integrated into   
Atos Origin (a France-based multinational IT services group providing end-to-end 
technological payment services). Thus, this is an example of a shift from the banking 
sector to a nonbank (and nonbank-owned company) of activities at the heart of the 
settlement cycle.  
For e-money and other innovative payment solutions, settlement also remains largely 
dominated by banks, which is consistent with two observations on the development of 
new payment methods in Europe. First, that innovation seems to have focused on means 
(using mobile, Internet technology) to access traditional banking funds transfers services 
(i.e. the so-called “access products”), rather than payment instruments alternative to those 
offered by banks.
9 Second, e-money as an alternative to instruments transferring bank 
deposits has remained somewhat underdeveloped compared to initial expectations and 
most e-money schemes in Europe are actually bank ventures with some notable 
exceptions (e.g., PayPal, which until recently, when it requested a banking license in 
                                                 
9 See ECB (2005b), where reporting the results of a survey on payment innovation (with a scope wider than 
e-money products only), it is concluded that “two-thirds of the (surveyed) companies are related to the 
banking sector, either by license or by ownership and, as a consequence, most of the e-products include a 
link to settlement.” This is also consistent with what was reported by Masi (2004), who notes that “the 
greatest part of the new payment initiatives does not modify the clearing and settlement phases of the 
payment cycle which are managed and regulated by banks.” Page  11 
Luxembourg, had operated as an ELMI).
10 
In summary, based on the limited data available, it can be concluded that nonbanks 
play an important role in several European countries, and we expect their role to grow 
further, particularly at the back-end, in those countries where their role is still somewhat 
more limited. Drivers will be: first, the growth of cashless payments; second, SEPA, and 
the resulting restructuring and consolidation ongoing within the payments processing 
outsourcing industry; third, the maturing of payments markets segments and substitution 
among payment classes favouring instruments whose growth is largely supported by 
nonbanks (cards and direct debits); and fourth, at the front-end, following the regulatory 
opening up of the market to a new category of nonbank payment services providers, the 
“payment institutions”.  
From a back-end perspective, it should be noted that the growth of the use of cards 
and the development of national card schemes has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of 
the market for card transaction processing, which was often characterized by “national 
champions” concentrating most of the transactions and allowing the exploitation of scale 
economies at the individual country level.
11 This market now seems to be undergoing a 
very dynamic phase in Europe, driven by the recent development of SEPA, the project to 
create a single European payment area by removing all legal, technical and commercial 
barriers within the European industry and making cashless payments in euro as easy, 
efficient and safe as it is today within one country.
12  Mazzi (2007) reports that according 
to figures and estimates available for the market share of third-party processors in the 
cards issuing market (EU 15 countries), for instance, in the four-year-period between 
2002 and 2006, the number of debit cards increased from 293 million to 342 million, and 
credit cards increased from 278 million to 362 million. In-house issuer processing by 
banks decreased from 42 percent to 33 percent for debit cards, and from 60 percent to 51 
percent for credit cards while the market share of third-party processors increased from 3 
percent to 7 percent for debit cards, and from 21 to 28 percent for credit cards (the rest 
was processed through shared bank-owned utilities).  
Furthermore, a consolidation process has started with the objective to achieve a 
sufficient scale to allow repositioning of national players as European players serving the 
common euro payment area. The process has recently accelerated and has taken various 
forms, through a wave of alliances and joint ventures, but also mergers and acquisitions, 
involving companies active at the same stage of the processing chain (horizontal 
                                                 
10 In 2003, e-money accounted for only 0.5 percent of payment transactions in Europe. EC (2006) reports 
evidence that “the e-money market has developed more slowly than expected, and is far from reaching its 
full potential,” and that as of late 2005 there were “only four ELMIs,” although the number was expected to 
increase as at least five-to-eight applications were either in process or expected shortly “ (however, about 
72 companies were operating at national level in seven Member States under a waiver)” noting also that, 
two-thirds of the e-money in circulation was issued by banks, and only one-third by ELMIs” (p.6).  
11 For example, SBB in Italy or Banksys and BCC in Belgium (the Belgian companies, previously owned 
by a consortium of Belgian banks, are now owned by Atos Origin, an international IT group.)  
12 SEPA is an industry-led project supported by the European Commission and by the ECB. Detailed 
information can be found on the websites of the ECB (www.ecb.europa.eu) and of the European Payment 
Council (www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu), the decision-making and coordination body of the European 
banking industry in relation to payments). Page  12 
integration) and at different stages of the chain (vertical integration).
13 For instance, in 
September 2006 the Dutch ACH Interpay and the German payments processors 
Transaktioninstitut agreed to merge to form Equens, a company aiming at serving the 
European market. Similarly, the international cards  payments processor SiNSYS was 
created by three national processors (from Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium), and is 
now owned by SIA-SSB (an Italian firm providing technology for cards payments, 
financial markets, payment systems and networks) and Atos Origin. At the beginning of 
2007, Atos Origin acquired the Belgian company Banksys (which offered charge 
authorization, security and guarantee of electronic payments in the country) and BCC 
(which affiliates merchants and manages the payment systems linked to Visa and 
MasterCard on behalf of nearly forty Belgian banks).  
The geographical scope of the SEPA project is wider than the euro-area countries and 
also includes all other Member States of the European Union, together with Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (the latter four subject to their adoption of a 
consistent legal framework). It is no surprise, therefore, that the consolidation 
developments mentioned above also have started to involve these countries: for instance, 
in March 2007, the Danish cards processor PBS and the Norwegian banking service 
provider BBS agreed to merge their card transaction processing activities into the new 
company Northern European Transaction Services (NETS), with the aim to service 
Nordic and European banks. 
An example of a global firm expanding in Europe by means of acquisitions is First 
Data.
14 The group, which has operations in 38 countries worldwide including 13 
European countries, has acquired several national players in various European countries, 
e.g. in Poland (POLCARD, a leading independent merchant acquirer and card processor), 
in Germany (Gesellschaft für Zahlungssysteme mbH, a leading processor of cashless, 
card-based payment transactions, and Telecash, the country’s premier network services 
provider), in Austria (Austrian Payment Systems Services, the national processor), and in 
Greece (Delta Singular Outsourcing Services, a leading payments processor). The 
company has also acquired a leading card processor in Central and Eastern Europe 
(EuroProcessing International), and the card processing unit of an Italian bank.  
Industry consolidation in Europe has taken place at the cross-border level both 
horizontally (involving companies operating at the same stage in the processing chain) 
and vertically (involving companies operating at different stages, e.g. ACH and cards 
processor). An interesting trend observed in this industry transformation process is that in 
various cases leading companies that were bank-owned and sometimes processed a large 
share of their national transactions have moved outside the banking domain from a 
governance point of view, and now belong to specialised IT international or multinational 
firms. The process of consolidation in the payments outsourcing business is not 
                                                 
13 Cordone (2004) and Moeller (2006) provide different examples of such cooperative ventures. See also 
Mazzi (2007) for a general picture about the status of the industry consolidation. 
14 First Data was a public company until September 2007, when its agreed acquisition by an affiliate of the 
private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) was completed. Page  13 
completed and is expected to accelerate further.
15  
At the front-end, the role of nonbanks is also expected to grow in the future, as one of 
the main innovations introduced by the recently adopted Payment Services Directive
16 is 
the opening up of the market by allowing actors other than banks and e-money 
institutions to provide payment services, the “payment institutions”, which are entitled to 
provide the payment services listed in annex to the Directive. 
There are five categories of services which enable the transfer of funds handled by the 
users: cash withdrawals and deposit transactions, transactions from an account or a line of 
credit including card payments, credit transfers and direct debits, international money 
remittances, transactions using mobile phones or the Internet, and issuance of payment 
instruments and acquisition of data related to the subsequent transactions (Margerit, 
2007).  Contrary to e-money licensed institutions, the payment institutions will be 
allowed to carry out other business activities (for instance, they could be merchants or 
telephone companies), but authorities may require them to establish a separate entity for 
the payments services. The Directive specifies that they may not conduct the business 
activity of taking deposits within the meaning of banking legislation, but they may 
provide credit if certain requirements are met (e.g. credit can be granted exclusively in 
connection with the execution of a transaction, short term, it cannot be granted from the 
funds received or held for payment transactions, and subject to the payment institution 
having an appropriate level of its own funds). One important innovation is that payment 
institutions will be allowed to set up “payment accounts” in the name of users, but the 
Directive introduces certain requirements aimed at safeguarding the funds received from 
users (the safeguarding measures introduced are described in more detail in section 4.1). 
2.2.3 U.S. nonbank prevalence 
To assess the role of nonbanks in payments in the United States, staff at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City completed the same survey as that distributed to EU survey 
respondents. Information utilized included industry directories and news articles, 
interviews with nonbanks and industry observers, and other sources more anecdotal in 
nature.  
Table 8 (p. 48) presents the results for the United States. Rows are the various 
payments activities and subactivities previously explained. Columns are the principal 
payment types found in the United States.  Payment types are listed in descending order, 
                                                 
15 See for instance the Atos Origin Half Year Report 2007 (p.12 “the payment services business process 
outsourcing (BPO) market is extremely diverse, containing a combination of suppliers with a background 
in various industry-specific processes, as well technology specialists and IT services providers. The market 
is starting to mature and we expect consolidation amongst service providers to continue. Growth is being 
driven by regulatory changes (such as the Single European Payments Area), a proliferation of payment 
styles (such as mobile payments), and security (such as chip and PIN in the United Kingdom, and the use of 
holograms)”). 
16 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment 
services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC 
and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (hereinafter, the Payment Services Directive) (Official Journal No. L319, 
of 5th December 2007. According to Article 94(1) of the Payment Services Directive, Member States will 
have to bring into force the necessary legislation to comply with its provisions before 1st November 2009. Page  14 
from those accounting for the highest share of noncash transactions in the United States 
(in terms of number of transactions) to those accounting for the lowest share of noncash 
transactions.  Shares are based on 2004 data.  In 2004, payment cards accounted for 45.9 
percent of noncash transactions; direct debits accounted for 6.9 percent; credit transfers 
accounted for 6.0 percent, e-cheques
17 accounted for 4.4 percent, and the e-money share 
was nearly negligible.  Within some of these broader categories, in turn, are shown more 
specific payments instruments:  three types of payment card transactions (four-party 
credit and signature debit (e.g., MasterCard and Visa), PIN-debit, and three-party credit 
(e.g., American Express, Discover, and private-label); three types of direct debits 
(automatic, one-time, and those completed under, for example, the Tempo and 
PayByTouch schemes); and four types of e-money and other pre-funded or stored-value 
instruments (open-loop prepaid card, closed-loop prepaid card, PayCash, and PayPal 
transactions). 
The most striking general observation about Table 8 is the high degree of blue and 
low degree of orange and pink in the table, indicating that where nonbanks can play a 
role in the payments process, that role is almost always an integral one. Looking across 
the payment type columns, almost all payment types show a significant nonbank presence 
in almost all facets of the payments process, with two exceptions. The first are those 
activities, shown in grey, that are not applicable, either because (i) they are inherently 
bank functions involving demand deposits, for example, some pre-transaction activities 
for credit transfers and automatic and one-time direct debits, or (ii) they are activities that 
are not applicable to that payment type, be it bank or nonbank, for example, transaction 
authorization activities for automatic debit transactions. The second exception to 
significant nonbank presence is settlement activities that involve posting credits and 
debits to financial institutions’ commercial and central bank accounts—here banks 
dominate.
18 Virtually everywhere else, nonbank presence relative to banks is high, and, 
indeed, prevalent.  
A more specific observation is that four-party payment cards and open-loop prepaid 
cards have the largest number of blue and green cells. This is because these payment 
types require more during-transaction Stage 1 activities—namely network switching and 
transaction routing through card-issuer processors—than other payment types. A 
complementary observation is that credit transfers have the smallest number of blue and 
green cells. This does not imply nonbanks’ importance in the credit transfer payment 
activities is relatively low; rather it implies this type of payment does not require as many 
activities as the other types of payment do.  
The message from Table 8 is clear—nonbanks are a force in the U.S. retail payments 
system, dominating a large number of payments activities for a large number of payment 
types.  
                                                 
17 A physically written cheque is either truncated and becomes an ACH payment at some point of cheque 
processing (ARC, BOC, and RCK) or is used as a device to capture information to create an ACH payment 
at the point of transaction (POP, TEL, and WEB). 
18 This also is a principal finding of Bradford, Davies, and Weiner (2003). Page  15 
3.  Risks in retail payments processing 
3.1  Risks in retail payments  
During the payments process various types of risks may arise, affecting different 
parties at different stages, and to varying degrees. This subsection provides a brief review 
of various risk categories relevant to processing retail payments and to clearing and 
settlement procedures
19. 
•  Liquidity and Credit Risks 
The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation for full value, either when 
due (liquidity risk) or at any time thereafter (credit risk).   
•  Operational Risk 
Operational risk is defined as the risk that deficiencies in information systems, 
internal controls, human errors, or management failures will result in unexpected losses 
(internal and external events).  Thus, one important component of operational risk is 
related to malfunctioning, which may be the result of unintentional circumstances or 
events (e.g. a computer breakdown or a processing slowdown, or organisational 
deficiencies) or intentional circumstances or events (e.g., attack or misuse of information 
or procedures). Recent changes in the retail payments system have increased awareness 
of the following types of risk, which are often thought of as subcategories of operational 
risk.  
• Data Security Risk: a form of operational risk involving unauthorized modification, 
destruction, or disclosure of data used in transactions or used to support transactions. 
•  Fraud Risk: risk of financial loss for one of the parties involved in a payment 
transaction arising from wrongful or criminal deception. The risk that a transaction 
cannot be properly completed because either the identity of the payer cannot be easily 
ascertained or the payee does not have a legitimate claim on the payer. 
• Counterfeit: the legal offence of making a false instrument in order that it may be 
accepted as genuine, thereby causing harm to others (forgery). 
Operational risk is, in general, relevant along the entire processing chain in the form 
of malfunctions. Other types of operational risk may be specific to a certain activity or a 
certain payment instrument. For example, fraud risk is most relevant for those steps of the 
processing chain involving authentication or identification with the related data being 
transmitted over telecommunication networks. For payment instruments that involve the 
                                                 
19 The definitions used in this section derive from various sources: for definitions of risks in the context of 
payments clearing and settlement (credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, settlement risk, and systemic 
risk) see BIS (2003) and the glossary annexed to ECB (2007(b). On various aspects of settlement risk, see 
also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000). On risks concerning, more specifically, retail 
payments (e.g. fraud risk, risk of a system-wide impact and reputational risk) see ECB (2007a) and CCBS 
(Handbook No.8). Page  16 
use of specific hardware (e.g. card readers), fraud risk is relevant if the hardware can be 
compromised or altered for illicit purposes (e.g. skimming or cloning of cards). Data 
security risk is relevant for all activities involving the storage and transit of payment 
sensitive data (data that may be used for identity theft or for illicit authentication or 
authorisation of payment transactions). Data security risk may result in fraud risk if 
exposed records are then used for illicit purposes.  
Traditionally, counterfeit risk applies to currency that is reproduced without 
authorization. Due to recent technological developments, some payment cards and tokens 
may store monetary value (e-money stored on a card/e-wallet).  E-money that is 
reproduced or altered without authorization has characteristics that are comparable to 
counterfeit paper money. The term counterfeit is now also commonly applied to 
unauthorized manufacture of cheques, card payment instruments or other physical tokens 
used in monetary transactions.
20  
•  Settlement Risk 
The risk that settlement in a transfer system does not take place as expected, usually due 
to a party defaulting on one or more settlement obligations. It comprises credit risks, and 
liquidity risks when they emerge in clearing and settlement systems. It also includes a 
specific form of credit risk, the risk of failure of the settlement agent, that is, the entity 
whose assets are used to settle the payment obligations (settlement agent credit risk). 
Settlement risk may also result from crystallisation of operational risk, as inadequate 
operational reliability, security and business continuity may affect the integrity of the 
data exchanged within the clearing and settlement process, and may result in financial 
losses for the involved or liable parties. 
 
•  Legal Risk 
The risk of loss because of the unexpected application of a law or regulation or 
because a contract cannot be enforced. For instance, application of law or enforcement of 
legal rights may be complex or challenging in case of payment instruments used 
internationally or in case of innovative products whose nature is not initially clearly 
defined, as can happen when a new payment solution presents elements of different 
payment instruments. In general, legal risk in clearing and settlement arrangements may 
be a source of settlement risk if the unexpected application of a law affects the positions 
of participants in the clearing and settlement process (e.g. unwinding, or insolvency of 
the counterparty resulting in freezing of assets or revocation of transfers by the 
liquidator). 
•  Reputational Risk 
The risk that the materialization of another risk category damages the confidence in a 
payment service provider. For example, it may result from the materialisation of 
                                                 
20 A cheque that bears a false signature or has been altered is properly called forgery. For our purposes, we 
include forgery with counterfeit risk.  Page  17 
operational or legal risk involving end-users and damaging the payment service provider 
brand or the payment instrument more generally in the case of a generalised disruption. 
The loss of reputation in a payment service provider may further increase actual problems 
of that service provider (e.g. access to liquidity) and may even finally result in the loss of 
public confidence in the payment instrument. 
•  Compliance Risk 
The risk of loss associated with non-compliance with laws, rules, regulations, 
prescribed practices, or ethical standards. The risk is borne by the issuing, the 
distributing, and the transaction archiving institutions and in general by the institutions 
subject to a compliance duty. The activities where this risk is most relevant are those 
related to security-related technology where market standards are in place (such as the  
Payment Card Industry (PCI) data security standard), and those where public regulations 
and laws aimed at combating the criminal use of the payment system (such as ex-ante 
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing controls and ex-post data archiving and 
reporting to authorities for the purpose of back-feeding to ex-ante databases and defining 
suspect operations profiles). At times these standards may affect a payment participant 
indirectly, such as when bank payment acquirers are directly responsible for PCI 
standards but they hold firms to which they outsource payment processing responsible for 
the standards.
21 To the extent that payment schemes are subject to oversight by the 
central banks (as is the case in several European countries), compliance risk may arise if 
the rules and management of the payment scheme do not comply with the regulatory 
standards. 
•  Systemic risk 
The risk that the failure of one participant in a transfer system, or in financial markets 
generally, to meet its required obligations will cause other participants or financial 
institutions to be unable to meet their obligations (including settlement obligations in a 
transfer system) when due. Such a failure may cause significant liquidity or credit 
problems and, as a result, might threaten the stability of financial markets. As far as retail 
payment systems are concerned, systemic risk does not usually represent a threat due to 
the limited value of payments settled. However, there are cases where some retail 
payment systems are considered to be systemically important as their malfunctioning 
may threaten the financial market (in the Euro area, when assessing the systemic 
importance of a retail payment system, the ECB and the NCBs take account of the market 
penetration within the respective retail payments market, the financial risks pertinent to 
the system, and the risk of domino effects).  
•  System-wide Risk 
From the perspective of specific payment instruments, it is unlikely that the 
disruption of the functioning of a single payment scheme or the impossibility to settle a 
specific payment instrument may result in systemic risk. However, a system-wide impact 
                                                 
21 Similarly, manufacturers of point-of-sale payment terminals and ATM manufacturers are not directly 
obligated by contractual relationships with payment networks, but must comply with network security 
standards if they hope to successfully market their products.  Page  18 
is possible, that is, the failure to settle an entire class of transactions could under certain 
conditions disrupt, at least temporarily, the functioning of the real economy by severely 
altering the capacity of economic agents to discharge their obligations on account of the 
unavailability of and/or lack of confidence in the payment instrument concerned (and 
substitutable payment instruments). Of course, the severity of the impact will in practice 
be dependent on the market structure for payment services and, in particular, on the 
importance of the specific payment instrument and its substitutes (see for example ECB 
(2007) for the case of cards schemes).  
3.2  Risks along the processing chain 
As briefly described in the previous subsection, various types of risks may arise 
during the payment process, and parties involved may be exposed to some of them at 
different stages, and to different degrees. Operational risk is present when payment orders 
are transmitted over communication networks. Parties that exchange assets to extinguish 
payment obligations may be exposed to financial risks (for example, liquidity and credit 
risk). All parties entering into contractual relations in the context of payments processing 
may be exposed to legal risk. Financial institutions that participate in clearing and 
settlement systems are vulnerable to operational, liquidity, and credit risk. These risks 
sometimes compound one another: if operational risk results in a computer outage, one 
payment participant may not receive funds from other participants, and it may need to 
refinance at higher prices, or suffer liquidity risk if it is unable to fulfil subsequent 
payment obligations, or incur legal risk if it is held liable to other parties.  
In case of outsourcing of activities to third parties, they may become subject to legal 
risks (if the responsibilities of the parties are not sufficiently clear or legally sound), and 
operational risk (if the outsourcing party becomes dependent on an improperly managed 
third party). In the case of outsourcing to a third party that concentrates the activities for a 
whole payment market segment, system-wide risk may arise if the third party becomes 
suddenly impaired or unable to operate. For payment service providers whose 
outsourcing activities are subject to regulation (as in the case of banks), compliance risk 
may arise. 
These risks and their relevance for the safe and smooth functioning of the payment 
system, financial markets, and the economy have been analyzed at length, particularly by 
central banks, and appropriate principles for their management and mitigation have been 
set at an international level. Although in general retail payments do not carry systemic 
risk, there are cases where retail payment systems have been considered systemically 
important.  
In this section we look at the vulnerability of certain payment activities to specific 
categories of risk by using a matrix representation (see Table 9, pp. 49-50). Our aim is to 
identify the types of risk to which specific payment activities are exposed, but we do not 
attempt to indicate the magnitude of the risk exposure. In later sections we will discuss 
controls that are in place to mitigate these risks.  
Before entering into a detailed analysis of the risks along the processing chain, we 
need to underline that certain risk categories by nature have a general relevance and are Page  19 
thus not represented as columns in the matrix. For instance, legal risk applies to payment 
transactions and to the payment process as a whole, and thus cannot be restricted to 
specific activities. Similarly, systemic risk may affect the funds transfer systems (where 
also retail payments may be settled) but it would be inappropriate to attach it to a specific 
activity in the process chain of an individual retail payment transaction. The likelihood 
and the severity of a system-wide impact would depend on the characteristics of the 
payment industry as a whole.  Finally, reputational risk is a general category risk that 
applies to all activities as each of them, if unduly performed, has the potential to damage 
the reputation of the payment service provider or affect public confidence in the safety or 
efficiency of the involved payment instrument.  
In the matrix we show liquidity risk, credit risk, and settlement agent credit risk. The 
matrix highlights with a yellow background where these risks materialize in the 
settlement process (settlement risk). Outside of the settlement process, credit and 
liquidity risk is borne by various parties involved in a payment scheme depending on the 
timing of the process, what party has custody of funds, and on the design of (and legal 
and contractual provisions governing) the specific payment instrument involved. For 
instance, typically a merchant accepting a payment instrument in exchange for goods or 
services is exposed to credit risk unless the payment is settled with success in real time or 
at the same time of the delivery of the goods or services, or unless the payment 
instrument contractual framework provides for its mitigation or transfer to another party 
(for example, payments by cards may be assisted by a guarantee provided by the card 
issuer or by the card scheme). In card schemes, the card issuer is typically exposed to 
credit risk vis-à-vis cardholders of its cards. When a card transaction is properly 
authorised and accepted for execution by/within a card scheme, the card issuer takes the 
credit risk by guaranteeing payment to the merchant.  
In the case where a retail payment is executed using a debit transfer order (for 
example, a direct debit) the payee’s account may be credited in some cases before the 
actual debiting of the payer’s account in the books of its bank. When this is the case, and 
if the payee’s bank has advanced the funds to its customer before the successful final 
debiting of the payer’s account, it may be exposed to liquidity risk or credit risk if the 
latter (payee) has already withdrawn the credited funds. In general, prepaid payment 
instruments entail a credit risk for the holder of the instrument vis-à-vis the issuer (such 
as in case of prepaid cards or e-wallets), while in case of post-paid payment instruments it 
is the payment service provider of the payee or the payee itself that is exposed to credit or 
liquidity risk. For example, this happens with post-billing payment services provided by 
certain mobile and telecommunication companies. This may also happen when a payment 
service is provided in real time to both payer and payee, but the top-up covering the 
specific payment is settled at a later stage (for example, a PayPal payment topped-up by 
direct debit on the payer’s bank account). 
As far as operational risk is concerned, we represent in Table 9 its general aspect 
(such as malfunctioning or human error) which is applicable to all activities, and 
operational risk in connection with data security and counterfeiting. Data security has 
recently attracted attention because numerous data breaches have allowed unauthorized 
access to sensitive data. Because the primary concern of data security is the potential for 
payments fraud as well as violation of responsibility to protect privacy of customers, the Page  20 
column notes these consequences in its label. Counterfeiting does not generally get the 
attention of data security, but statistics for the United States suggest that in terms of its 
cost, fraud through counterfeiting is far more costly than that from data breaches. Cheque 
fraud, for example, is estimated to cost 10 to 20 billion dollars per year in the United 
States, a sum that is larger than estimates of fraud in all other forms of retail payments.  
In card schemes, the party suffering the loss deriving from materialisation of fraud 
risk is determined by the scheme’s rules, and depends on a number of factors, including 
the physical environment in which the transaction was executed (POS or card-not-
present), the time of the transaction in case the cardholder had informed the issuer that 
the card had been stolen or lost, and the security and risk mitigation techniques employed 
by the merchant and acquirer; as a rule, the loss is suffered by card holders only up to 
certain amount (but they may also be exempted) provided they have complied with 
notification requirements, by the card issuers  if the transaction had been authorised and 
accepted, by the merchant if it had not complied with the security standards for POS 
transactions, and by the acquirer in the case of card-not-present fraud. 
Although operational risk is relevant to the settlement process, it has a particular 
prominence for retail payments, and we find it useful to highlight those activities where 
the payments process may be particularly vulnerable to it.  
The next-to-last column of Table 9 shows compliance risk. Payment participants can 
be required to comply with specific laws, regulations, and contractual arrangements. In 
the United States, payments are subject to legal requirements under the uniform 
commercial code and regulations such as the Federal Reserve’s Regulation E. Members 
of payment networks (ATM, ACH, online debit, offline debit, and credit card) are 
contractually bound to comply with operating and security standards set by the network. 
One of the most significant recent efforts to improve data security in card payments is the 
payment card industry data security standard (PCI standard).
22 The standard was revised 
in January 2005 and the payments industry is in a transition phase to the new standard. 
Banks that are in the participating card network are responsible for complying with the 
standard as well as ensuring that its outsourcing partners and payment clients comply 
with the standard. Payment participants subject to compliance risk can face significant 
penalties if it is found that they do not properly follow guidelines set forth for data 
security and other operational requirements.  
The last column of Table 9 is for risk associated with illicit use of payments. One of 
the traditional focuses of law enforcement efforts to curb illicit use of payments is money 
laundering. Payment participants, such as a bank, are sometimes required to monitor use 
of bank accounts and to report suspicious activities. More recently, policymakers have 
been concerned with the use of the payments system to fund terrorist activities, which is 
another form of illicit use of the payments system. A tool used to combat illicit use of the 
payments system is to carefully identify and screen new customers before granting access 
to the payments system. In the United States, banks are now required to use more reliable 
forms of identifying consumers when they open bank accounts. Banks are also obligated 
                                                 
22 The standards were developed as collaboration between American Express, Discover Financial Services, 
JCB, MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa International.  Page  21 
to carefully identify and screen merchants before accepting them as clients for payment 
services, and to monitor their ongoing use of payments. These efforts help to keep out 
those who desire to use the payments system for illicit purposes. Payment participants 
that fail to implement required guidelines to curb illicit use of payments face the risk of 
penalties if their failure to comply is discovered. In Europe not only banks but also other 
parties are required by the Third Anti Money Laundering Directive
23  to comply with 
obligations concerning customer due diligence, reporting of suspicious transactions, 
record keeping and statistical data, and to take other supporting measures, such as 
ensuring the proper training of personnel and the establishment of appropriate internal 
preventive policies and procedures. 
In Table 9 we associate the various payment activities with liquidity, credit and 
settlement risks, with operational risk and its main subcategories, and with compliance 
and illicit use risk. We believe there are three broad messages evident in the table. First, 
settlement risk is a prominent feature of retail payments. But, though it is present, 
analysts and policymakers generally believe that settlement risk in retail payments is well 
controlled.
24  Second, counterfeit risk is limited to a small number of payment activities. 
However, despite the limited impact on payment activities, counterfeit risk is one of the 
most significant problems in payments today, accounting for most of the losses due to 
payments fraud. Third, operational risk is one of the most prominent sources of risk in 
terms of the number of payment activities it affects. Most of the risk is in problems such 
as malfunctions and in data security. Associated with the prominence of operational risk 
is compliance risk, because imposition of rules and regulations on payment participants is 
a major containment tool used by regulators and payment networks to compel behaviour 
that properly manages operational risk.
25 The key to understanding the prominence of 
operational risk is the shift of payments toward electronic forms. The payment activities 
and subactivities listed in the table are dominated by processes that facilitate or depend 
upon electronic forms of messaging. These processes have emerged as we have adopted 
electronic payments. As a result the locus of retail payments risk has shifted toward 
operational risk.  
In the light of the above results, do nonbanks raise special risk considerations? In the 
next section we look at this question in the light of the importance of nonbanks in 
payment activities as described in Section 2.2.  
                                                 
23 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing is 
applicable to the financial sector as well as lawyers, notaries, accountants, real estate agents, casinos, trust 
and company service providers. Its scope also encompasses all providers of goods, when payments are 
made in cash in excess of €15,000. 
24 This serves as a reminder that the purpose of Table 9 is to help identify where risk occurs in the many 
activities that underlie payments, not their severity. 
25 This method of containing risk in retail payments is common, in part because methods such as pricing for 
risk or insurance have proven inadequate to bring the level of risk in retail payments to tolerable levels (see 
Braun et al , forthcoming 2007). Page  22 
4.  Impact of nonbanks on risk 
4.1  Risks and nonbank presence in the EU 
As seen in section 2.2.2, nonbanks are important in several European countries, and 
we expect their role to grow further, both at the front-end and at the back-end, 
particularly in those countries where their role is still somewhat more limited. Their role 
is most visible and seems more important in processing of payment instruments where 
the pre-transaction phase is highly automated, as in the case of cards.  
4.1.1 Risks that can be generated at various points along the whole processing 
chain    
The growth of payment instruments which are processed online and characterised by 
real-time authorisation brings along a business model where all the parties involved – and 
not only the banking sector – communicate with each other and interact. This involves a 
more complex mechanism with a multiplicity of contact points and the dissemination of 
sensitive data at various points along the processing chain, and the consequent 
vulnerability to risks in terms of data security and data (privacy) protection as any 
interaction point can be, in itself, a weak point in the chain suitable to being exploited by 
a criminal to intrude the payment network for illicit purposes. Payments fraud implies a 
possible liability for banks even if the data compromise enabling the fraud may have 
taken place at a nonbank level. In this sense, banks need to cooperate and coordinate with 
nonbanks to properly control risk throughout the processing chain.  
The industry and regulators are making great efforts to combat payments fraud on 
several fronts, including regulatory (the implementation of the Payment Services 
Directive will, inter alia, facilitate the use of data for payments fraud prevention 
purposes), and in terms of cooperation between the public and private sector and among 
enforcement agencies. As regards the industry, the adoption by merchants of PCI 
compliant systems and processes for data security and the implementation of EMV 
standards are an important step toward mitigation of these risks. In Europe the migration 
to EMV is progressing (According to industry reports, 58.8 percent of the payment cards, 
66.1  percent of the bank ATMs, and 51.7 percent of the point of sale terminals have 
already been migrated to EMV in Europe. Work is progressing toward full migration in 
time for SEPA (2010). There are however significant country differences).
26  As far as 
PCI is concerned, it was recently reported that 57 percent of the surveyed large merchants 
were not compliant with at least one PCI standard (the percentage fell from 73 percent 
last year
27). In the European countries where cards market penetration is less advanced 
and still growing, as is the use of e-payment solutions which often rely on cards transfers 
for completion or top-up, these risks may not yet be particularly perceived. However, 
these countries may be better positioned in ensuring that these threats are properly 
minimised at an early stage of adoption, and well before maturity, because banks and 
nonbanks (merchants in particular) are not constrained by legacy systems and may adopt 
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directly state-of-the-art and PCI and EMV compliant technology. There are indications 
that fraud is a phenomenon of international and in Europe, of pan-European dimension, 
as organised crime operates from multiple locations and exploits to its benefit the global 
reach of the internet (Vulpiani, 2006 and Sarazin 2006). This raises an issue of 
international coordination among industry members, regulators and enforcement 
agencies. 
The recently adopted Payment Services Directive harmonises completely the 
regulation of liability related to fraud and execution of “unauthorised transactions”. Here 
the bank or nonbank nature of the payment service provider is not relevant as the 
provisions apply to all payments generally (before notifying the service provider of the 
loss or theft or fraudulent use of its payment instruments the consumer may have to bear 
a loss of up to 150 EUR, but Member States may reduce this cap when transposing the 
Directive into national legislation (Margerit, 2007)). 
Other risks that are relevant in general and may generate from improper control 
throughout the whole processing chain are legal risk, reputational risk and, under certain 
circumstances, systemic risk. The Eurosystem has statutory competence in the field of 
oversight of payment systems, including both payment systems and payment instruments, 
and therefore may ensure monitoring and, if required, intervention (in various forms, 
regulatory, operational, through moral suasion and industry cooperation) aimed at 
preserving public trust in the safe and efficient functioning of payment systems in the 
euro area. 
4.1.2 Risks related to settlement activities 
Settlement activities remain largely a prerogative of the banking sector, and in the 
euro area clearing and settlement systems are subject to oversight by the Eurosystem. The 
fact that in some European countries nonbank processors may play a role also at the 
settlement stage may point to the importance of nonbanks in activities that are at the heart 
of interbank transfers, and thus a possible impact in terms of settlement risk. However, 
only in one case (Belgium), the nonbank company involved is today also nonbank 
owned. The change was mostly related to governance only, and the company was and 
continues to be subject to oversight by the National Central Bank. This ensures that its 
role and impact on the functioning of the payment systems are fully understood and 
managed.  
One issue that may be relevant from the point of view of settlement risk is the nature 
of assets used for discharging obligations among participants in four-party card schemes. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, in Europe there are different solutions in place as regards 
the settlement stage of cards-related interbank obligations. In some countries (as in 
France), national card transactions are settled in the ACH or other national retail payment 
system. In others, they may be settled by banks bilaterally (for example in Austria). 
Furthermore, as it relates to international cards transactions, the correspondent banking 
channel normally is used for settling interbank positions. When transactions are settled in 
commercial bank money, members of a card scheme are exposed not only to credit risk 
vis-à-vis the other members that participate in the scheme’s multilateral clearing, but also 
to the failure of the settlement agent. This risk is usually minimised by the scheme Page  24 
selecting large and high-standing banks as settlement agents. However, the risk cannot in 
principle be ruled out. Moreover, when large amounts are involved, or the payment 
instrument is a prominent one for a country or there are no easy substitutes, moral hazard 
issues may arise as the settlement agent bank may be considered “too important to fail.” 
In Europe, the national central banks that carry out oversight of payment instruments 
usually also oversee the national card scheme and contribute to ensuring the safety and 
soundness of these payment and the systems involved. Furthermore, the National Bank of 
Belgium oversees MasterCard Europe.
28 In May 2007, the Eurosystem started a public 
consultation of a Draft Oversight Framework for Card Payments Schemes (CPSs) 
proposing requirements which, if observed, would contribute to the soundness of CPSs. 
The requirements emanate from a risk analysis conducted by the Eurosystem.
29 
4.1.3 Credit and liquidity risks outside the settlement stage  
We have seen that credit and liquidity risks may be related to various steps in the 
processing chain and the party that is exposed to them depends on the contractual features 
of the specific payment instrument concerned.  We related these risks to the activities 
involving the enrolment of customers and merchants and as far as the “during 
transactions” stages are concerned, the initiation of the crediting or debiting of the 
parties’ accounts.  
In the EU, payment services can be provided by credit institutions, by e-money 
licensed institutions, and by other nonbank providers. The regulatory coverage of 
payments services largely depends on the bank versus nonbank status of the payment 
service provider, and its affiliation to a banking group: 
•  Banking regulation applies to all activities carried out by credit institutions, including 
those related to the provision of payment services. The banks’ settlement business 
line is explicitly considered in the framework of operational risk management and 
subject to coverage in the form of capital requirements
30.  
•  As other nonbank undertakings which belong to a group including a credit institution, 
nonbank providers of payment services which belong to a banking group fall within 
the scope of supervision of the credit institution on a consolidated basis, following 
specific criteria of consolidation. Prudential supervision authorities may obtain from 
all undertakings within a group the information necessary to achieve their objective to 
assess the financial situation of the credit institution within the group.  
•  As far as other  nonbank front-end providers of payment services  are concerned, 
payment services may currently be provided under very different conditions within 
the European Union, as shown in EC (2003)
31. Overall, the regulatory provisions for 
the different types of payment services vary significantly across the Member States, 
                                                 
28 ECB (2007b), Blue Book 2007, Volume I, p. 78.  
29 ECB (2007a). 
30 The revised (BASEL II) solvency requirements for credit institutions, envisages an 18 percent capital 
charge for payment and settlement services provided by credit institutions under the “standardized 
approach.” 
31 Comparative tables of the national regimes in place in the various Member States are available at 
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ranging from no license requirement in one country to the restriction of the activity 
only to banks or other licensed financial institutions in another country (for example, 
for money transmitters, in Denmark no license is required, in Spain there is a special 
license regime for this type of activity, while in France the law requires a credit 
institution license with fully-fledged prudential regime). However, this is an area 
where a great innovation has been introduced by the recently adopted Payment 
Services Directive. The Directive has in fact opened up the market by allowing actors 
other than banks and e-money institutions to provide payment services, the “payment 
institutions”, which are entitled to provide the payment services listed in annex to the 
Directive. There are five categories of services which enable the transfer of funds 
handled by the users, knowing that the funds may be withdrawn by the users after the 
transactions have been executed: cash withdrawals and deposit transactions, 
transactions from an  account or a line of credit including card payments, credit 
transfers and direct debits, international money remittances, transactions using mobile 
phones or the internet, and issuance of payment instruments and acquisition of data 
related to the  subsequent transactions (Margerit, 2007).  The payment institutions 
will be subject to a simplified prudential framework compared to that applied to 
banks and e-money licensed institutions, with the aim to ensure their safe and prudent 
management and to protect users from risks arising from payments services 
provisions. For instance, use of customers’ funds would be subject to limits (they 
only could be used for payment transactions; the balance of an account should not be 
commingled with those of other user accounts, nor with the funds of the payment 
service provider, although under certain circumstances the Member States or the 
national authorities may choose alternative solutions to funds segregation, for 
instance protecting them from claims of other creditors of the payment institutions in 
case of insolvency, or a financial guarantee). The Member States will have to 
designate the authorities in charge of licensing and supervising the payment 
institutions. These authorities could consult payment systems overseers (the central 
banks) when granting authorisation, without prejudice to the Eurosystem’s oversight 
statutory powers. 
4.1.4 Risks related to outsourcing to third parties 
In the previous section we saw that the activities required for processing of retail 
payments present possible vulnerability to the traditional risks categories along the whole 
processing chain, not only at the settlement stage.  Following the massive adoption of 
electronic communication and processing technology in payments processing, there was a 
shift of risk relevance toward operational risk in its various forms. Does the role played 
by nonbanks in Europe impact on these risks trends? In those countries where nonbank 
processors and vendors are already prominent, they have often supported the industry 
growth and move toward straight-through-processing (STP), which substantially 
increases efficiency and reduces malfunctioning related to manual handling and human 
error, but increases dependency on automated systems reliability. Banks have 
traditionally been able to control very well these operational risks when dealing with 
payments processing in-house and through bank-owned processors. From this 
perspective, outsourcing to companies that are best equipped to grant high levels of 
security and business continuity can significantly contribute to maintaining the 
operational soundness of the payments process while reducing its cost (in fact, Page  26 
specialised processors usually operate on a large scale and can benefit from significant 
economies). Through outsourcing technical and IT-intense processes, banks not only free 
up resources that they may devote to their core business, but ensure that these processes 
are handled by specialised companies which invest high resources in state-of-the-art 
technology and  concentrate specialised knowledge and skills. The vulnerability to risks 
inherent to the payments processing chain does not depend on the bank or nonbank status 
of the processor, but on the way risks are controlled. The relevant regulation depends on 
the institutional status of the outsourcing company: 
•  Banks are subject to strict regulation which ensures they control risks and remain 
responsible for their management and containment vis-à-vis banking regulators also 
when outsourcing processes to third parties. According to banking supervisory 
practices, outsourcing remains the responsibility of the outsourcer and in some cases 
it is subject prior to approval by or information to supervisors. 
•  In the case of ELMIs, it is specified that the “sound and prudent management, 
administrative and accounting procedures, and adequate internal control mechanisms” 
they are required to put in place should respond to the financial and non-financial 
risks to which the institutions are exposed including technical and procedural risks as 
well as risks connected to its cooperation with any undertaking performing 
operational or other ancillary functions related to its business activities (Art. 7 of 
Directive 2000/46/EC).  
•  Regulatory safeguards regarding outsourcing by other nonbank providers of payment 
services is not harmonized at EU level, but it will be once the Payment Services 
Directive comes into force: the Directive prescribes information requirements to the 
competent authorities and sets conditions and limits for outsourcing of “important 
operational activities.”
32 The Directive also specifies that the authorities supervising 
the payment institutions would be entitled, i.a., to carry out on-site inspections also 
with any entity to whom payment services activities are outsourced 
In Europe, the consolidation process implies the emergence of a smaller number of 
larger payment processors which serve larger shares of the payments market segments. 
This concentration may bring about a higher profile for system-wide risk, and an 
increased dependency of the banking sector on the nonbanking sector.  
4.2  Risks and nonbank presence in the U.S. 
4.2.1 Comparison of nonbank prevalence to risk in payment activities   
Nonbanks in the U.S. payment system are subject to every type of risk cited in Table 
9 and so the general comments above on risk in payments apply accordingly. There are 
some specific subactivities tied to the enrolment of customers and authorization of 
payments where nonbanks play a vital role in controlling liquidity and credit risk. 
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materially impair the continuing compliance of a payment institution with the requirements of its 
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Nonbanks are generally present along the entire payment processing chain and so have a 
role in operational risk and the consequent issues of related risks such as compliance, 
data security, and illicit use of payments.  
4.2.2 Risk implications 
There is little quantitative information on the extent to which nonbanks contribute to 
payment risk in the United States. Losses due to fraud are a frequently cited measure of 
payments risk, but there is no information available that allows an assessment of nonbank 
responsibility for payments fraud.  
Data breaches are widely reported as a problem for payments and may serve as a 
measure of data security risk. Table 10 (p. 51) shows an analysis of data breaches that 
have occurred in the United States from January 2005 to April 2007. The data were 
assembled by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, which relies on public information 
sources. They list breaches where information exposed would be useful for identity theft, 
which often manifests itself in fraudulent use of some type of payment. The information 
is sufficient to roughly identify the sectors of the economy where the data were 
compromised.  
During this 28-month period, 541 data breaches were publicly reported. Most of the 
breaches—402—occurred in the second half of the period (after April 1, 2006). We 
cannot conclude with certainty that the number of data breaches actually increased 
because numerous new laws on notification were implemented after the middle of 2005, 
at least partially causing a rise in publicly-disclosed data breaches.  
Still, the publicly-disclosed data breaches can be interpreted as revealing one of two 
undesirable aspects of retail payments risk. Either the 139 incidents reported in the first 
half of the period significantly understate actual data breaches, or the number of breaches 
increased rapidly in the second half of the period.  
Data breaches compromised nearly 154 million records. Roughly three-quarters of the 
records were compromised in just three incidents: the large data breaches at TJX and 
CardSystems, and a data breach reported in May 2006 at the U.S. Department of 
Veteran’s Affairs that compromised 28.6 million records. These three incidents 
compromised a total of 116 million records. Like many measures of risk, very few 
incidents can account for a large portion of losses.  
Occurrences of data breaches and compromised records do not necessarily go hand in 
hand. The nonbank payment processor sector accounted for only 2.5 percent of all data 
breaches but 26.5 percent of compromised records. This sector was responsible for nearly 
75 percent of compromised records in the first half of the period. On this data, a re-
evaluation of public policy toward risk management for nonbank payment processors 
may be valuable.
33  
The bank and financial services sector accounted for 9.4 percent of incidents and 4.1 
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percent of records compromised over the entire period. The worst blemish for bank and 
financial services was the 10.7 percent share of records compromised in the first half of 
the period. However, the share fell to only 0.6 percent in the second half.  
Importantly, Table 10 reveals that a large number of data breaches have occurred in 
education, retail, health care, and government sectors. These four sectors together 
account for 77 percent of data breaches in this particular period. Data breaches in the 
education and health care sectors account for only 3.2 and 0.8 percent of all records 
compromised, so these breaches tend to reveal small numbers of records. The retail and 
government sectors have been hit with breaches that have revealed large numbers of 
records. However, given that data breaches that reveal large numbers of records are rare, 
we cannot assume that it is unlikely that the education and health care industries will be a 
victim of a large data breach. Any industry that stores a significant amount of sensitive 
data is an attractive target for hackers.  
The education, retail, health care, and government sectors are not normally associated 
with the U.S. payments system. However, to the extent that sensitive information is 
useful to making fraudulent payments, these sectors may be important to efforts to reduce 
the vulnerability of the payments system.
34  
4.2.3 Public regulation and oversight of payment risk management in the U.S. 
Public policy toward risk management in payments has encompassed consumer 
protection, data security, prudential supervision, and law enforcement.
35 Table 11 (p. 52) 
describes these areas of concern, their legal basis, and other details of regulation and 
enforcement. The extent and complexity of public involvement vary across elements of 
the payments process (from initiation to final settlement), institutional aspects of the 
payments industry, and the legal issues tied to payments. As shown in the last column of 
Table 10, bank and nonbank payment providers face different oversight regimes in the 
area of data security and prudential supervision. 
For example, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 set data security requirements for 
financial institutions and therefore applies to payments data. If a bank outsources 
payment processing to a nonbank, then the nonbank is subject to the same data security 
standards as banks. There is no similar federal data security requirement for nonfinancial 
institutions. To some extent, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has filled this gap by 
enforcing data security standards for retailers and other organizations. The FTC views 
breaches of payments data security as an unfair and deceptive business activity. In cases 
of breaches of payments data, it has reached settlements with firms as diverse as retailers, 
payment processors, and software developers.
36  
                                                 
34 How important particular economic sectors are regarding data breaches and payments risk requires 
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4.2.4 Supervision and regulation 
The difference in prudential supervision of some nonbank payment processors can be 
traced to enabling legislation that recognizes the special nature of banks and a desire to 
limit the extension of bank-like oversight to nonbank entities. As a result, oversight of 
some nonbank payment providers that are subsidiaries of financial institutions is 
conducted under the same supervisory process applied to the banking organization. 
Payment providers that are completely independent of financial institutions but are in an 
outsourcing relationship with financial institutions are supervised under an alternate 
regime. In addition, some larger nonbank payment providers that are bank affiliated are 
also supervised under the alternate regime.
37  
Selected nonbank payments providers are overseen by the same agencies that 
supervise financial institutions. Supervision of payment providers is conducted within a 
broader program that oversees technology service providers (TSPs). The TSPs offer a 
wide variety of technology services, and some (but not all) services are related to 
payments. A risk evaluation of individual TSPs identifies those that would come under 
the supervisory program and determines the time frame for examination and monitoring 
activity.
38  
At year end 2004, 125 TSPs were supervised (Table 12, p. 53). Both bank-affiliated 
and independent TSPs are in the program, but twice as many independent TSPs are 
supervised. Core processing (computer processing of general ledger accounting and of 
information systems), offered by 68 of the supervised TSPs, is the single most important 
line of business.
39 But payments are important to these TSPs, with nearly 70 percent 
offering at least one type of payment processing service.  
While the largest independent payments providers are probably represented in the 
TSP supervision program, it does not cover all TSPs that offer payments services. For 
example, after a 2005 security breach at a payments processor, news stories reported the 
existence of roughly 500 companies that process credit card payments.
40 But at most 87 
payments processors were supervised at year end 2004 (Table 12).  
One reason that many nonbank payments providers are not supervised is that the 
enabling legislation is sufficiently narrow to exclude many significant payment providers. 
In particular, independent TSPs must be in an outsourcing relationship with a bank to be 
eligible for supervision. But many payment providers are customers of banks. For 
example, PayPal or Ceridian Corp. originate many payments and pass that information to 
banks for further processing.
41 In this instance the originator is purchasing payment 
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reported lines of business is uncertain. However, it seems unlikely that any misreporting would be biased 
regarding payments activity and so the relative position of bank versus nonbank payments providers should 
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provide payment services to financial institutions.  
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services from the bank. A similar relationship exists between banks and acquirers of POS 
transactions or originators of many ACH  transactions. As such, risk management via 
direct supervision is currently not an option for these elements of the U.S. payment 
network.  
There are two factors that may make prudential supervision of nonbank payment 
providers in the United States weaker than supervision of financial institutions. First, the 
purpose of TSP supervision is not the survival of the TSP or the viability of its business 
model.
42 Rather, the TSP supervision program is targeted as a service to the supervisors 
of depository institutions. It is useful because examiners of depository institutions have a 
resource that they can draw upon to understand the risks that an outsourcing relationship 
might pose for the depository institution. A TSP examination seeks to ensure that there is 
a control environment that adequately addresses these risks. Protection of the payments 
system is a secondary, though important, concern of prudential supervision.  
Second, supervisory agencies can examine independent payment providers but have 
limited enforcement power if they find weaknesses at the organization. Enforcement 
powers over financial institutions include voluntary agreements, cease and desist orders, 
removal or prohibition of individuals from an institution or the industry, civil money 
penalties, termination of deposit insurance, appointment of bank conservators, and 
divestment of activities.
43 Enforcement powers over independent payment providers 
include only voluntary agreements and prohibitions on financial institutions from doing 
business with the service provider.  
4.2.5 Oversight of the U.S. payment system 
The Federal Reserve has responsibility to oversee the payments system by monitoring 
payments systems, assessing them for safety and efficiency, and inducing change when 
necessary.
44 The Federal Reserve System issued its Policy on Payments System Risk to 
provide guidance on principles and minimum standards for managing risk in systemically 
important payments systems.
45 While aimed primarily at wholesale, large-value payment 
systems, it is also relevant to retail payments systems. The Federal Reserve applies these 
standards to the retail payments systems (ACH and cheques) that it operates and where it 
has explicit supervisory authority over financial institutions that operate clearing and 
settlement systems. The Federal Reserve also participates in national and international 
policy processes that set standards for operating and controlling risk in payments 
systems.  
The authority of the Federal Reserve System to oversee payments, however, is 
limited. Recently Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that “[i]n contrast to the situation in 
some other countries, the Federal Reserve lacks explicit legal authority to oversee 
systemically important payments systems.”
46 Federal Reserve examiners can review 
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payment activities of the banks in its jurisdiction and they also participate in the TSP 
supervision program. Federal Reserve authority to set regulations also has important 
influence on some operational aspects of payments and on incentives to control risk by 
determining liability in cases of fraud and operational disruptions. But neither the Federal 
Reserve, nor any other federal agency, has explicit authority to manage retail payments 
risk from a system perspective.  
4.3  Changing risk profiles: implications of rising nonbank presence for risk 
The risk profiles of payment systems (and the risk mitigation techniques employed to 
minimize exposure to them) may change over time, following the introduction of new 
business models, the restructuring of business processes, the reorganization of systems, or 
simply the introduction of new technologies and the adoption of innovative means of 
communication. In particular, the recent use of open communication networks for the 
transmission and storage of payment related information (including sensitive personal 
data) has affected all payment systems. Because the pace of change has accelerated, a risk 
category that is particularly relevant for retail payment instruments is reputational risk, 
due to the reliance on public trust for their acceptance. In addition, data security risk, 
fraud risk and counterfeit risk for e-money have become more prominent.  
This section addresses the question of how the widespread and rising presence of 
nonbanks in retail payment processing affects risks that are normally present in payment 
systems. Included are examples of incidents involving nonbanks that in theory could have 
affected the safe functioning of payments systems and payment schemes or affected 
public confidence in payment instruments.  
Access to payment systems traditionally has been restricted, at least in part, to banks 
and other intermediaries that are subject to prudential supervision. One reason is to 
reduce risk exposures that may emerge among payment systems participants during the 
clearing and settlement process (typically in retail payment systems). Another reason is 
that the accounts used by banks to settle reciprocal payment obligations (as principals or 
on behalf of their customers) are accounts held either one-with-another (nostro and loro 
accounts, as in correspondent banking) or with one central institution that serves a larger 
banking community. Examples of such central institutions are central banks, which have 
a long tradition of establishing and operating payment systems for the banking sector. 
Both self-interest and regulation have led banks to develop strong safeguards against 
illicit intrusion in their information technology systems and networks.  
The rising importance of nonbanks and the multiple roles they play both at the front-
end and back-end of the payments chain has changed this traditional setting. In some 
ways, nonbanks contribute to an increase in the relevance of certain risks. In other ways, 
nonbanks decrease the relevance of other risks or facilitate the containment of risks.  
Nonbank presence may increase the vulnerability of payment systems to certain risks. 
This may happen in at least three ways. 
First, on the simplest level, nonbanks pose risk because they may offer alternative 
points of entry for criminals into the payments system, particularly in the early stage of 
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the introduction of new payment solutions. One example of this kind occurred in 2000, 
when two individuals used unauthorized access to Internet service providers (ISPs) in the 
United States to misappropriate credit card, bank account, and other personal financial 
information from more than 50,000 individuals, hijacked computer networks and then 
used the compromised processors to commit fraud through PayPal and the online auction 
company eBay.
47  Since this incident, PayPal has been successful at improving its data 
security and fraud detection systems.
48   
Second, and more broadly, banks traditionally act as gatekeepers to the payments 
system. When banks outsource payment processing services to nonbanks they provide 
nonbanks with a de facto, technical access to the payments systems that may increase 
vulnerability to various sources of operational risk. Traditionally, banks have managed 
these relationships to reduce this risk, but incidents may materialize, as shown by a recent 
example: the U.S. company CardSystems, Inc. experienced a breach of its computer 
system in 2005 that exposed 40,000,000 records of transactions with 263,000 records 
stolen. Credit card associations determined that CardSystems violated their security and 
record retention standards and, as a result, Visa chose to refuse transactions from 
CardSystems. At the beginning of 2007, another major data breach occurred at the large 
retailer group TJX, which operates over 2000 stores in various countries, including the 
UK and Ireland. The breach exposed more than 90 million card account numbers. Losses 
to banks and other issuers have been estimated at between 68 million and 83 million USD 
for the 65 million Visa accounts exposed alone (Kerber, 2007).  
In the period between end June 2004 and November 2006, the MasterCard Stop-It 
service to combating phishing resulted in identifying 3,743 phishing/spoof sites, 99 
percent of which were taken down by the end of November. The service also detected 
1,334 carding/e-commerce sites (web sites where criminals sell cards data), of which 95 
percent were shut down within 24-48 hours, and identified 54,653 unique MasterCard 
account numbers for sale/trade.
49 According to a Visa Europe report on account data 
security in 2005 there were 91 incidents (one every four days), and there were several 
hacks involving European acquirers and merchants. This resulted in over 1 million cards 
exposed, and the cost of fraud amounted to USD 30 million (Littas, 2006). Although 
these examples point out that criminals attempt attacks on an increasingly large scale 
through IT technology, the actual level of fraud can be considered low (for instance, 
according to Visa Europe Annual Report 2006, the fraud to sales ratio was 0.069 percent 
of total POS spending). 
Another incident involved data breaches related to unloyal staff of outsourcing 
companies. For instance, a UK journalist reported that he was able to buy details about 
1000 UK customers from a Delhi call centre worker, for GBP 4.25 each, saying that both 
cards credit numbers and account passwords were for sale.
50  
In addition to outsourcing, a very similar risk may arise when banks sell payments 
services to nonbanks. Banks mitigate this risk with know-your-customer practices that 
allow banks to detect attempts to exploit payment services and carry out illicit activities. 
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An example of bank liability for improper monitoring of payment services provision to a 
nonbank customer was reported in the United States in 2003, when the Federal Trade 
Commission issued press releases explaining how it had closed down several companies 
(the Assail Telemarketing Network and affiliates) that engaged in fraudulent 
telemarketing activities. Assail used the ACH services of First Premier Bank; the bank 
admitted that it had failed to perform due diligence on the activities and legitimacy of its 
customers (but it did supply information to the investigative agencies); the bank later paid 
$200,000 in fines as part of a wider settlement and agreed to vigorously engage in know-
your-customer actions and ongoing monitoring of customer activity.
51   
To limit such risks, banks must screen and understand potential nonbank clients and 
service providers, execute contracts that delineate responsibilities and liabilities, and 
monitor the business activity and internal control environment of the nonbank. While this 
risk is not new to banks, the difficulty faced today is that the payment system gatekeeping 
function may be more of a challenge because established methods of screening and 
monitoring may be inadequate given the development of new payment types and 
emergence of new types of business (such as online retailers). Moreover, this gatekeeping 
function may have become more critical compared to the past because of the complexity 
of the computer technology involved, which can be exploited in a manner that is fast, can 
be scaled to large values, and can be difficult to detect or trace.  
Third, in some cases nonbanks play a key role for the functioning of an entire retail 
payment system, either because they run the infrastructure used by it, or because they de 
facto concentrate the processing for an entire retail payments market segment. Under 
these circumstances, nonbank presence may have implications at the system level. While 
concentration is often the natural consequence of the huge scale economies present in the 
payment industry, it also makes these key service providers a potential single point of 
failure that could trigger a large scale disruption.
52 For example, the international credit 
card system relies on very few cards schemes. A major disruption at a key player may 
have the potential to impair the ability of millions of customers in several countries to 
make card payments.  
Dependencies of banks on external nonbank parties/networks other than outsourcing 
companies have also increased, not only in terms of business relations but also in terms of 
capability to mitigate risks. For instance, cooperation of payment service providers with 
Internet providers is key to combating payment fraud via IT systems in terms of promptly 
shutting down fraudster web sites and phishing sites. Nonbank third-party processors may 
also subcontract to other nonbanks and one possible issue is how risk related to activities 
that are subcontracted is controlled, especially because in case of problems banks may 
face compliance risk as well as the ultimate reputational risk with users of payment 
instruments. 
The above discussion points out that nonbank access to payment systems may entail 
some risks. Furthermore, such risks may be exacerbated by the trend toward electronic 
payments, as electronic payment networks require a high degree of simultaneous 
coordination among all participants, with an increased need for cooperation between 
banks and nonbanks. In principle, this is not directly related to the nonbank status of the 
                                                 
51 Iowa Attorney General, (2005).  
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new service providers, but rather to the fact that the presence of many different entities in 
a payment network complicates its design, its functioning, the sequence and execution of 
transactions, and the regulation and implementation of security standards.  
Nonbanks have been very active in introducing new access modalities to traditional 
bank payment services, and in facilitating the conversion of one payment instrument into 
an electronic format that allows its processing in the infrastructures that originally where 
designed for other payment instruments. This innovation has caused some blurring of the 
lines between payments channels. Various U.S. payment channels, for example, are 
becoming less distinct. Most visibly, some cheque payments are now being converted 
into ACH payments. But there are other changes that make the lines between payments 
systems less obvious. The ACH system is developing its systems to be more and more 
useful for retail payments. The ACH is also being used for some significant large-scale 
payments, such as the settlement of payments arising from the credit cards networks.  A 
useful concept for resiliency in the payments system is redundancy: if one channel has 
problems, users may be able to get by using another channel until the problems are 
solved. But because of the interdependence of payments channels, the level of 
redundancy may have decreased, with adverse effects on service continuity. The 
extension of payments systems to new uses also increases potential for cross-channel 
risk. For example, criminals typically exploit weaknesses in the payments system. If one 
payment channel improves its security, criminals will probe other channels as 
alternatives. This may explain why fraud attacks concentrate on innovative payment 
communication networks and do not seem to attempt the relatively more isolated and 
protected typical transmission networks such as SWIFT. 
It should be noted that nonbanks also bring new technology and perspectives that can 
significantly contribute to reducing risk in the payments system. For instance, 
outsourcing some security-related activities like customer authentication to specialized 
firms may result, in principle, in better management by the outsourcing banks of certain 
threats to payments security and, thus, in an improvement of the risk mitigation 
techniques they employ. Furthermore, the payments industry as a whole benefits from the 
adoption of innovative process designs for traditional payment instruments. For example, 
the overall level of credit risk exposure may decrease by the adoption of online real-time 
controls of funds or credit limit coverage for submitted payment instructions. Nonbank 
service providers are proposing to the industry significant innovative technological 
solutions, such as biometric authentication, which may reduce fraud exposure. This may 
however bring about more complex processing models, and increase the profile of 
exposure to operational risk in its various forms. 
Data security risk, fraud risk, and reputational risk have become more prominent with 
the increased occurrence of fraud cases. Risk of intrusion (outsiders, hackers’ attacks) has 
increased, due to a higher number of contact points/links/interfaces between internal 
systems and open networks and increased local storage of payment sensitive data that 
may be used in remote payment initiation. In recent years, payment fraud by using IT 
systems or IT-compromised payment data allowing false authentication and illicit 
execution of payments is considered to have increased in most European countries, 
although comprehensive and comparable statistics are not yet available. In particular, it is 
believed that in general the organised crime has shifted its attention from attacks aimed at  
individual users of e-banking and e-payment solutions to the more potentially effective Page  35 
hacking of data warehouses (in terms of possibility to achieve mass data compromise).  
The UK has a more advanced effort to statistically monitor payment fraud. Even 
though the UK is not included in our survey, their figures may provide a general idea of 
the size of the potential losses involved. UK  authorities have calculated that the losses 
resulting from payment cards fraud amounted in 2004 to GBP 504.8 million (about EUR 
740 million). Of this amount, about 30 percent derived from card-not-present transactions 
(GBP 150.8 million, or EUR 221 million) and another 25 percent from counterfeit cards, 
manufactured from skimmed data or by card cloning techniques (GBP 129.7 million, or 
EUR 190 million).
53 Efforts to mitigate fraud-related threats have been successful, thanks 
to progress in technology for encryption, identification and authentication, and to 
significant industry efforts such as the migration to chip/PIN cards and the use of 
smartcards.  However, as solutions are implemented to combat a specific threat, 
fraudsters devise new methods of exploiting other weaknesses. In the UK the successful 
adoption of chip and PIN cards led to a decrease in fraud losses, and in 2006 the total 
losses had declined to GBP 428 million (about EUR 627 million).  In particular, there 
was a 23 percent decline in counterfeit card losses. However, this was accompanied by a 
strong increase in card-not-present fraud (up 40 percent from 2004). Thus, fraud in the 
electronic world is a moving target and requires constant monitoring of IT threats 
employed at the expense of the financial sector and of the payments industry in 
particular.  
Recent developments in retail payments systems have raised concerns that market 
forces may not adequately control risk because of greater reliance on electronic payment 
networks and the associated increase in nonbank payment providers. The primary issue is 
that an individual participant in an electronic payment network has incentive to 
implement risk controls that reflect private costs and benefits. But the interrelated nature 
of participants in the payments network implies that some benefit of individual risk 
control accrues to other network participants. This implies that the social benefits of 
implementing risk controls will be greater than the private benefits. From society’s point 
of view, without some form of policy interference in the payments market, insufficient 
resources may be applied to controlling risk in payments.
54  
There are many examples of security incidents at one point of the payment system 
causing problems elsewhere in the system. Banks have been forced to reissue their 
payments cards because of unauthorized access to data elsewhere in the payments 
system. Merchants are exposed to chargeback expenses because a criminal uses a 
counterfeit card. Consumers have been victims of payment fraud that results in 
significant out-of-pocket expenses. Nonbank processors bear the expense of upgrading 
the security of their payments infrastructure. In the end, all participants in the payments 
system are exposed in some manner.  
Insufficient incentives to manage risk in the payments system may contribute to these 
problems. However, it is difficult to know the severity of incentive problems.  Self-
interest will lead to some risk management efforts by all participants in payments. 
Moreover, if everyone in the payments system managed risk in a socially optimal 
                                                 
53 Fraud Prevention Expert Group (2007), Report on Identity theft and fraud, available at ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/fpeg/index_en.htm.  
54 Bank of England (2000), p. 172.  Page  36 
manner, we would still observe some amount of security problems and payments fraud. 
As a result, a balanced public policy toward management of risk in payments seems 
warranted. Efforts by private industry to manage payment risk should be encouraged and 
supported. Carefully designed regulations can help coordinate industry efforts and 
maintain industry standards. Laws and criminal penalties can deter fraud and other 
misuse of the payments system. Finally, the importance of confidence in the overall 
payments system--a public good--should not be underestimated.  
5.  Conclusions and closing remarks 
In this paper we have reviewed the role played by nonbanks in the retail payments 
industry, both as front-end and back-end providers of services. We assess this role as 
being prominent in the United States and high in several of the surveyed European 
countries.   In the United States, this is true across all payment instruments and along the 
entire processing chain.  In Europe, this is true for cards in most countries and, in some 
countries, for most payment instruments, although there are differences concerning 
national preferences in the use of certain payment products, as well as in available data.  
In Europe, for some payment instruments, little information is available, particularly for 
payment instruments that are not widely used or whose use is declining. 
We conclude that the role of nonbanks has margin for further growth in Europe, 
driven by the SEPA project, the restructuring and consolidation of the payments 
processing industry, and the growth of payment instruments whose processing models 
rely more heavily on third-party processors (for example, cards, which imply real-time 
authorisation and interplay among the parties involved in the scheme). Card transactions 
are growing significantly in Europe, particularly in those countries where maturing 
payment instruments are being replaced with electronic-based payments. Finally, changes 
in the regulatory environment will soon allow nonbank front-end payment service 
providers (the payment institutions) to operate within Europe in a harmonised framework, 
and their role is expected to increase.  
Next, we analysed the risk categories that are most relevant for retail payments and 
showed that, while some of them (legal risk, reputational risk, and systemic risk) are of a 
general nature, others may be associated directly with specific activities along the 
payments processing chain. Due to the adoption of advanced technologies and more 
complex processing and business models (characterised by the interplay of numerous 
parties, IT systems, and databases), we found that some categories of risk have become 
more prominent. This is particularly the case with operational risk in its various forms 
(malfunctioning, data security, and fraud), and associated reputational risk.  
Evaluating how these developments impact the nature and balance of risks between 
banks and nonbanks and the multiple roles they play, we conclude that controlling for 
risk may have become more challenging in the new environment. 
First, nonbanks increasingly have gained access to payment systems (directly, or 
indirectly in the form of a technical access following outsourcing), and the resulting more 
complex networks of systems, relations, and interactions require a higher degree of 
coordination among participants. The regulation and implementation of security 
standards, for example, may have become more complex, and different incentives and Page  37 
interests may need to be reconciled.  In principle, unless safeguards are in place, a 
heightened nonbank presence could present new points of entry for criminals into the 
payments system. Looking to the future, as new technologies are introduced and new 
contact points and players enter the picture, new potential vulnerabilities may need to be 
addressed. For example, vulnerabilities in WiFi communication networks could present 
new security challenges, and telephone malware could be used to spread viruses to 
consumer applications and to gain control of payments data stored in cell phones or data 
warehouses.  These are just examples to show that the more contact points there are 
between networks and users and the more complex their functioning, the more 
challenging is risk control. 
Second, the trend toward using a given payment infrastructure for different payment 
instruments (for example, converting one payment type into another for easier 
processing, or introducing payment instruments that present features of other 
instruments), increases potential for cross-channel risk. For instance, criminals may tend 
to focus attacks on more-recently adopted open networks instead of bank-controlled 
proprietary networks. If criminals are able to misappropriate authentication and 
authorisation data and procedures, they may be able to submit “apparently” correct 
instructions to banks and into the payment system.  The result would be fraud, with the 
ultimate cost, in terms of both financial cost and reputational damage, borne in many 
cases by banks. 
Third, to the extent nonbank processors concentrate a larger share of payments in a 
certain market, a system-wide impact of disruption at a key player is possible. 
While some of these risk issues do not originate from the bank or nonbank status of 
payment service providers, their control may be more challenging because the 
implementation of risk safeguards, particularly those introduced by regulation, may be 
designed and enforced starting from the assumption that payments safety depends on 
banks. These models may in some cases need to be reconsidered or complemented in 
light of the increased importance of nonbanks. In Europe, for example, the regulatory 
framework for banks and nonbanks providing payment services has been harmonised 
both at the front-end and back-end. Furthermore, the Eurosystem has clear statutory 
competence in oversight of payment systems and may take action in various forms, if 
deemed appropriate, to safeguard the safety and efficiency of payment systems, as well as 
public confidence in the payment instruments, irrespective of the bank or bank-nature of 
the entities involved. 
We also note that nonbanks and some of the technologies they have introduced into 
payments processing have in many instances contributed to a reduced exposure to various 
sources of risks. Such contributions should not be underestimated, as they support banks’ 
and other nonbanks’ efforts toward reducing operational risk and fraud risk, in particular. 
Given the global reach and open-access nature of many of the technologies  currently 
being utilised in payments networks, increased cooperation among bank and nonbank 
supervisory authorities, and among bank and nonbank industry players performing 
functions at various stages of the payments chain, would be appropriate, not only at the 
domestic level but, increasingly, at the international level as well. 
Finally, we note that many of the observations and conclusions in this paper are 
necessarily preliminary.  Reflecting the lack of comprehensive and comparable data, we Page  38 
could not assess the severity of the various risks categories, nor the net overall effect on 
payments safety. Although efforts are being made by both the private and public sectors, 
particularly as regards the relevance of fraud risk, this is an area where more research is 
clearly warranted.  As regards the role of nonbanks in Europe, the analysis of this paper 
could be complemented once more detailed and comparable data for the surveyed 
countries were available. This study has focused primarily on the euro area. A more 
complete assessment of nonbanks’ role in Europe would require data for the remaining 
European markets. Page  39 
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Table 1: Broad Payment Types 
1   Electronic Cheques
2   Credit Transfers
3   Direct Debits
4  P a yment (Credit/Debit) Cards
5   e-Money and Other Pre-funded/Stored Value Instruments (including Internet P2P)  Page  44 
Table 2: Payment Activities 
Primary Activity Subactivity
a Registration and enrollment of customers as payers (consumers)
b Registration and enrollment for merchant accounts or deployments of ATMs
a Provision of credit evaluation/credit risk assessment tools
b Application processing services
a Card issuance, card production; card personalization; card delivery; card activation
b
Hardware and software production (such as a card reader)  for usage with a consumer's online device 
(PC, mobile, handheld)
c Provision of e-money wallet / access code to e-money values
d Cheque manufacturing
a Provision of ATM terminals (sell/lease; manage)
b Provision of POS terminals
c Provision of cheque readers/cheque POS terminals
a Web hosting services 
b Provision of shopping cart software 
c Provision of software to connect payment gateway service providers
d Provision of cheque verification software
a
Certificate-authority services (such as PKI-based secure environments); provision of digital identity 
services for consumer authentication 
b
Provision of online transaction security systems to front-end customers (payees, merchants), and back-
end customers (such as 3D-secured card transactions via internet)
c Provision of e-signatures and other e-authorisations for payment authorisation purposes 
7
Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance services to merchants
and/or payers
a
8 Provision of data center services to back-end customers a
Outsourcing complete data center functions/secured, supervised floor space/multi-site backup 
storage for disaster recovery 
9 E-invoicing a Creation and delivery of electronic invoices to front-end customers (payer)
a Provision of gateway to acquirer/payment processors
b Provision of gateway to various networks/check or ACH authorization vendors
a Provision of network switch services; a back-end service
b Provision of communication connection between networks and payment instrument issuers
c
Provision of decision management/fraud screening/neutral network scoring system to card issuers 
for authorization
d
Process to verify and confirm if payer has sufficient funds (or credit lines) available to cover the 
transaction amount
a
Verification services (address, IP address, card verification number, other data), Payment instrument 
authentication and authorisation services 
b Identity authentication
c
Decision management/fraud screening/neutral network scoring system (hosted at third-party service 
providers)
13 Fraud and risk management services to card issuers a
Monitoring transactions and notifying cardholders of potential fraud, enabling them to take 
immediate action
14
Initiate the debiting of the front-end customer's (payer's) account
(during transaction)
a Debiting the front-end customer's (payer's) account / e-money purse
15 Ex-ante compliance services a
Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulation such as controls to identify suspicious 
transactions (database, software etc.)
a Sorting merchant's sales information by payment instrument/network for clearing
b Submission of sales information to each payment instrument network
c
Calculation of each network member's (either financial institution or processor) net position and 
transmission of net position information to each member
d Provision of transformation services into other payment instrument formats (such as MICR to ACH)
e Provision of sorting transactions by destination groups to financial institutions
a Transmission of clearing orders (credit transfers, direct debits, cards, cheques) to a financial institution
b Transmission of clearing orders to ACH operator 
c Distribution of advices showing the amounts and settlement dates 
d Clearing (different from an ACH)
a Posting credit and debit at each financial institution's central bank account
b Posting credit and debit at each financial institution's commercial bank account
c Posting debit (credit in case of a return) to front-end payer account
d Posting credit (debit in case of a return) to merchant (payee) account
e Check settlement
a
Provide statement preparation/delivery services for front-end customers (payers) (such as mobile 
credit advice; online bank/card account statements)
b Provision of statement/payment receipt notification services for merchants (payees) 
20 Reconciliation, incl. collection and receivable management services a Matching invoices and payments 
21 Retrieval a Provision of chargeback and dispute processing services
a to merchants, such as support services for treasury and accounting 
bt o  c o n s u m e r s
c to financial institutions
23 Ex-post compliance services a
Compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulation, such as reporting to 
authorities, back-feeding to ex-ante databases
Pre-Transaction
1 Customer acquisition
2 Services for issuer's front-end customer (payer) acquisition
3
Provision of payment instruments/devices to the front-end
customer (payee or payer) 
4 Provision of hardware to accept payment instruments/devices
5 Provision of software to accept payment instruments/devices
6 Provision of internet security-related technology/support 
During-Transaction Stage 1
10 Communication connection for merchants
11 Transaction authorization (fund verification)
12
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Table 3: Nonbank Importance: EU: Payment Cards 
 
% on country total 31.7% 15.0% 33.5% 30.5% 58.4% 36.8% 44.9% 11.2% 8.4% 39.6% 53.5% 30.3% 37.5% 22.7% 8.9%
% on EU27 22.7% 10.5% 6.3% 5.1% 3.5% 3.2% 2.7% 1.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
























































* In Germany a number of nonbanks are bank-owned
Importance Data Quality
Prevalent High
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Table 4: Nonbank Importance: EU: Credit Transfers 
 
% on country total 43.1% 18.9% 35.5% 31.5% 50.3% 49.4% 54.2% 7.8% 76.8% 86.1% 58.3% 11.6% 42.2% 8.6%
% on EU27 31.7% 14.2% 7.0% 5.6% 4.8% 3.1% 2.0% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0%




































































During-Transaction - Stage 1 














 Page  47 
Table 5: Nonbank Importance: EU: Direct Debits 
 
% on country total 40.6% 17.2% 27.9% 37.1% 12.8% 37.4% 12.4% 5.6% 16.8% 4.9% 13.5% 0.1% 2.7% 0.4%
% on EU27 36.6% 15.8% 6.7% 4.3% 2.8% 1.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
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Table 6: Nonbank Importance: EU: E-Cheques 
 
31.1% 15.6% 21.0% 1.0% 47.6% 24.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.4%
54.7% 6.5% 3.1% 1.7% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
























































* In Germany a number of nonbanks are bank-owned
Importance Data Quality
Prevalent High
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Table 7: Nonbank Importance: EU: E-Money 
 
3.0% 6.4% 0.3% 0.1% 1.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.5% 0.1% - - - - - nav
35.5% 34.8% 12.1% 5.9% 5.7% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% - - - - - nav
























































* In Germany a number of nonbanks are bank-owned
**(% may be overestimated due to lack of data for e-money issued in the UK, which is not included in EU total) 
Importance Data Quality
Prevalent High





Not able to judge
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Table 8: Nonbank Importance: United States 
Type of Payment and
Share of Noncash Payments 
4-party 
Credit/ Sig. 



























































































During-Transaction - Stage 1 
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a Registration and enrollment of customers as payers (consumers) x x x x
b Registration and enrollment for merchant accounts or deployers of ATMs x x x x x
a Provision of credit evaluation/credit risk assessment tools x x x
b Application processing services xx
a Card issuance, card production; card personalization; card delivery; card activation x x x x
b
Hardware and software production (such as a card reader)  for usage with a consumer's online device 
(PC, mobile, handheld)
xx x
c Provision of e-money wallet / access code to e-money values x
dC h e q u e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g xx x
a Provision of ATM terminals (sell/lease; manage) xx x
b Provision of POS terminals xx x
c Provision of cheque readers/cheque POS terminals xx
aW e b  h o s t i n g  s e r v i c e s   xx x
b Provision of shopping cart software  xx x
c Provision of software to connect payment gateway service providers xx x
d Provision of cheque verification software xx x
a
Certificate-authority services (such as PKI-based secure environments); provision of digital identity 
services for consumer authentication 
xx
b
Provision of online transaction security systems to front-end customers (payees, merchants...), and 
back-end customers (such as 3D-secured card transactions via internet)
xx x
c Provision of e-signatures and other e-authorizations for payment authorization purposes  x x x
7
Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance services to 
merchants  and/or payers
a xx
8
Provision of data center services to back-end 
customers
a
Outsourcing complete data center functions/secured, supervised floor space/multi-site backup 
storage for disaster recovery 
xx x
9 e-invoicing a Creation and delivery of electronic invoices to front-end customers (payer) xx x
a Provision of gateway to acquirer/payment processors xx x
b Provision of gateway to various networks/check or ACH authorization vendors x x x
a Provision of network switch services; a back-end service xx x
b Provision of communication connection between networks and payment instrument issuers x x x
c








Verification services (address, IP address, card verification number, other data), Payment instrument 
authentication and authorization services 
xx x
b Identity authentication xx
c
Decision management/fraud screening/neutral network scoring system (hosted at third-party service 
providers)
xx
13 Fraud and risk management services to card issuers a




Initiate the debiting of the front-end customer's 
(payer's) account (during transaction)
a Debiting the front-end customer's (payer's) account / e-money purse; a back-end service x x x x
15 Ex-ante Compliance services a
Anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulation such as controls to identify suspicious 
transactions (database, software, and so on)
xx
Notes: 
Data security risk is associated with the online environment. 
Counterfeit and associated fraud is limited to physical payment instruments (checks and payment cards) used in an offline environment. 
12
Fraud and risk management services to front-end 
customers (payees)
Activity Type of Risk
Primary Activity Subactivity
Liquidity and Credit Operational
Compliance
During-Transaction Stage 1
10 Communication connection for merchants
11 Transaction authorization (fund verification)
4
Provision of hardware to accept payment 
instruments/devices
5
Provision of software to accept payment 
instruments/devices
6
Provision of internet security-related 
technology/support 
2
Services for issuer's front-end customer (payer) 
acquisition
3
Provision of payment instruments/devices to the 
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a Sorting merchant's sales information by payment instrument/network for clearing x x x
b Submission of sales information to each payment instrument network xx x
c
Calculation of each network member's (either financial institution or processor) net position and 
transmission of net position information to each member
xx
d Provision of transformation services into other payment instrument formats (such as MICR to ACH) x x
e Provision of sorting transactions by destination groups to financial institutions x x
a Transmission of clearing orders (credit transfers, direct debits, cards, cheques) to a financial institution  xx
b Transmission of clearing orders to ACH operator  xx
c Distribution of advices showing the amounts and settlement dates  xx
d Clearing (different from an ACH) xx
a Posting credit and debit at each financial institution's central bank account x x x
b Posting credit and debit at each financial institution's commercial bank account x x x x
c Posting debit (credit in case of a return) to front-end payer account x x x x
d Posting credit (debit in case of a return) to merchant (payee) account x x x x
e Check settlement xx x x
a
Provide statement preparation/delivery services for front-end customers (payers) (such as mobile 
credit advice or online bank/card account statements)
xx
b Provision of statement/payment receipt notification services for merchants (payees)  x x
20
Reconciliation, incl. collection and receivable 
management services
a Matching invoices and payments  xx x
21 Retrieval a Provision of chargeback and dispute processing services xx
a to merchants, such as support services for treasury and accounting  x
bt o  c o n s u m e r s  x
c to financial institutions  x
23 Ex post Compliance services a
Compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulation, such as reporting to 
authorities, back-feeding to ex-ante databases
xx x
Notes: 
Yellow shading of table cells indicate activities and components of settlement risk. 
Data security risk is associated with the online environment. 
Counterfeit and associated fraud is limited to physical payment instruments (checks and payment cards) used in an offline environment. 
Post-Transaction
19 Statement





Activity Type of Risk
Primary Activity Subactivity
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Table 10: Publicly Reported Data Breaches in the United States 
January 2005 to April 2007 
 







Education Retail  Health  Care Government  Other or 
unknown  Total 
  A: Number of incidents 
51 16  149  101 51 118 55 541  All incidents 
9.4% 3.0%  27.5%  18.7% 9.4% 21.8%  10.2%   
16 6  58  21  14 11  13  139  before 4/1/2006  11.5%  4.3% 41.7% 15.1% 10.1%  7.9%  9.4%   
35 10 91 80 37 107 42 402  after 4/1/2006 
8.7% 2.5%  22.6%  19.9% 9.2% 26.6%  10.4%   
  B: Records compromised 
6,352,711  40,691,306 4,961,749  61,288,322 1,244,716 35,761,123 3,393,818  153,693,745  All records  4.1% 26.5%  3.2% 39.9%  0.8%  23.3%  2.2%   
5,725,850  40,200,526 2,491,827 2,765,590  391,300  960,183 1,227,330 53,762,606  before 4/1/2006 
10.7%  74.8% 4.6% 5.1% 0.7%  1.8% 2.3% 35.0% 
626,861 490,780  2,469,922  58,522,732 853,416  34,800,940  2,166,488  99,931,139  after 4/1/2006  0.6% 0.5% 2.5%  58.6% 0.9% 34.8% 2.2% 65.0% 
 
Notes: Data are based on information collected by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and accessed on their web site April 8, 2007. Classification by sector of 
origin and other calculations are by the authors.  Page  54 
Table 11: Public Regulation Relevant to Payment Risk Management in the United States 
 
Area of 
Regulation  Description  Legal basis  Enforcement authority  Regulations or guidelines 





responsibilities in check 
and electronic funds 
transfers 
State check laws; Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act of 1978 
For checks, state legal 
authorities; for electronic funds 
transfer, federal agencies 
(financial institution 
supervisory agencies* or the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission according to their 
jurisdiction) with the Federal 
Trade Commission covering 
retailers and others payment 
participants not covered by 
other agencies 
For electronic funds 
transfer, the Federal 
Reserve Board’s 
Regulation E specifies 
disclosure, payment 
authorization,  




Data security  Safeguarding and 
disclosing to customers 
the use of sensitive 
nonpublic customer 
information 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999; various federal and state 
laws concerning unfair and 
deceptive acts in business 
transactions 
Federal financial institution 
supervisory agencies*; Federal 
Trade Commission 
Federal Reserve Board’s 
Regulation P and 








Periodic examination and 
ongoing monitoring of 
the financial health and 
prudential operation of 
the institution 
Various laws enabling 
supervision of financial 
institutions; The Bank Service 
Company Act of 1962; state 
laws covering money 
transmitters 
Federal financial institution 
supervisory agencies* 
State and federal 




payments, such as 
Regulations J (check 
collection) and CC 
(check funds availability) 
Generally unequal with 
the possible exception 
of where banks 
outsource payment 
processing to nonbanks 
Law 
enforcement 
Efforts to counter trends 
in illegal data breaches, 
identity theft, and money 
laundering 
USA Patriot Act of 2001; Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970; state law 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Cyber Operations group; Secret 
Service Electronic Crimes Task 
Force; Department of the 
Treasury Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network; state 
and local law enforcement 
Electronic Crimes Task 
Force website (www. 
fincen.gov/reg_guidance.




*Federal financial institution supervisors include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the National Credit Union Administration. Page  55 
Table 12: Business Lines Offered by Supervised Technology Service Providers 
Year end 2004 
 
Bank affiliation status  All TSPs 
Independent Bank  affiliated Business Line 
N Percent N  Percent  N  Percent 
Core processing  68  54.6%  37  44.6%  31  73.8% 
Any payments-related business line*  87  69.6%  55  66.3%  32  76.2% 
Other business line**  21  16.8%  19  22.9%  2  4.8% 
Total number of TSPs  125    83    42   
 
 
*ACH processing/services, ATM processing/services/network/switch, bill payment service, credit card issuance, credit and/or debit 
card merchant processing, credit card network/switch,  check processing, check processing software vendor clearing and settlement, 
POS processing/services/network/switch, and wholesale payments. 
**Retail e-banking/transactional website hosting, electronic record safekeeping, imaging, loan or mortgage processing/servicing, 
corporate e-banking/cash management, website hosting (informational), disaster recovery, investment processing,  aggregation, 
asset/liability management, credit scoring, other emerging technologies, employee benefit account processing, asset management 
processing, bank image processor, debit card "services", Internet services, IRA "services", payroll "services", safe deposit, student 
loan processor, trust processing services, Visa "services." 
 
Notes: Many TSPs are double counted because they offer core processing, payments, and/or other business lines. As a result, the 
sum of the number of TSPs in each category is greater than the total number of TSPs, and the sum of percentages is greater than 100 
percent. Bank affiliation status is determined by a significant ownership position by one or more depository institution, whether run 
as corporations, limited partnerships or limited liability companies. An independent TSP has no significant ownership by a 
depository institution.  
 
 
 
 
 